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CHILDREN’S EQUALITY RIGHTS: EVERY CHILD’S RIGHT
TO DEVELOP TO THEIR FULL CAPACITY
Nancy E. Dowd†

Children are born equal. Yet as early as eighteen months, hierarchies emerge among
children. These hierarchies are not random but fall into patterns by race, gender, and class.
They are not caused nor voluntarily chosen by children or their parents. The hierarchies
grow, persist, and are made worse by systems and policies created by the state, perpetuating
the position of the privileged and continuing the disadvantage of the subordinated.
Children’s equal right to develop to their capacity is severely undermined by policies and
structures that hamper and block the development of some by creating barriers and
challenges or failing to support them.
This Article argues that hierarchies among children violate their constitutional
rights, by both the infliction of harm and the failure to provide affirmative support. It
documents how our policies and structures reinscribe inequality on children and proposes
a constitutional obligation to the contrary. The Article takes on the challenge of
articulating a general constitutional theory of children’s rights, suggesting that children’s
status, circumstances, and needs are the basis for a distinctive claim of positive rights.
Among the most critical of those positive rights is the right to developmental equality:
the right of every child to maximize their developmental potential. Equality of development
is a universal right of every child based on the principles of equality, equity, and dignity at

† Professor and David H. Levin Chair in Family Law, Fredric G. Levin College of Law, University
of Florida. I thank the College of Law and Dean Laura Rosenbury for supporting this research, as well
as Aalborg University, where I served as a Distinguished Guest Professor while writing this Article.
Conferences at the University of Oslo in the fall of 2018 and lectures at University College Cork in 2018
enriched my thinking about children’s rights in the context of countries who accept and function within
such as a given. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Angela Harris, and Stephanie Bornstein provided
valuable, detailed feedback on the Article in draft for which I am deeply grateful. My ongoing
collaboration with my colleagues at the Anita Zucker Center for Excellence in Early Childhood Studies,
Dr. Patricia Snyder, and Dr. Maureen Conroy, continues to influence my vision of children’s rights and
essential interdisciplinary collaboration.
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the core of our equal protection jurisprudence. To make this claim, the Article unearths
existing hierarchies and identifies the parameters of children’s equality that are
constitutionally meaningful. It then grounds a proposal for children’s constitutional rights,
including a positive right to developmental equality, in existing constitutional doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION
Children are entitled to equality. All children are born equal in human
dignity and with equal rights to fully develop their cognitive and human
potential.1 But they are not born into equal circumstances.2 Differences in
newborns’ innate capacity for development are dwarfed by the effects of
their environments and the inequalities they face. Differences of context,
linked to policies, structures, and systems, become the basis for children’s
inequalities and hierarchies.3 Inequality emerges in infancy, and hierarchies
worsen during childhood, not due to anything over which parents or
children have any control, but due to differences in context. The differences
are not simply the result of individual circumstances. Rather, the absence of
social support and the presence of roadblocks and challenges create the
hierarchies that stymie children’s equal development. The random
opportunity of one context over another, one family over another,
embedded within neighborhoods and communities unequally supported,
linked to unequal systems of health, education, and economic support,

1 See generally Margaret R. Burchinal et al., Early Intervention and Mediating Processes in Cognitive
Performance of Children of Low-Income African American Families, 68 C HILD DEV. 935, 935 (1997);
Jeffrey Brown et al., Socioemotional Trajectories in Black Boys Between Kindergarten and the Fifth Grade:
The Role of Cognitive Skills and Family in Promoting Resiliency, 83 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 176
(2013); Kristin M. Scott et al., From Higher Order Thinking to Higher Order Behavior: Exploring the
Relationship Between Early Cognitive Skills and Social Competence in Black Boys, 83 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 185 (2013).
2 See infra Section I.A.
3 See NANCY E. D OWD , REIMAGINING EQUALITY: A NEW DEAL FOR CHILDREN OF COLOR 42–53
(2018) [hereinafter DOWD, REIMAGINING EQUALITY]. Inequalities are differences. Hierarchies are
rankings of people or groups by status. The inequalities I focus on are constructed, not inherent
differences. The hierarchies among children from most to least favored are largely based on identities.
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translates into the likelihood of inequality and hierarchy.4 Instead of
supporting children’s innate equality, we create hierarchies that are tied to
our failures to give them equal opportunities to thrive.
In this Article, I articulate a constitutional theory of children’s rights
under which children have distinctive equality rights. Children’s
constitutional rights have been recognized, but the theoretical basis and
scope of those rights is an undeveloped area of constitutional doctrine.5
Moreover, even in those areas where children’s equality rights have been
recognized, most notably with respect to education, in Brown v. Board of
Education,6 equality has been defined in a crabbed, limited way that has
allowed inequalities by race and other hierarchies among children to be
perpetuated, even exacerbated, over time. Brown and its progeny have been
a failure for children; this definition of equality must be challenged and
reclaimed.7
Children’s equality rights ultimately rest on their common humanity,
their common value, and their need for support in order to develop.
Essential to that development are their families, neighborhoods,
communities, and other adults with whom they commonly interface:
caregivers, teachers, coaches, healthcare workers, police officers, and other
adults. It is the responsibility of the state to facilitate children’s equal
development.8 Their needs require state support to sustain their equality
from birth until they reach the benchmark of independent citizenship.9

4 Susan Nittrouer calls this the “ovarian lottery,” borrowing the term from Warren Buffet, who
identifies himself as a lottery winner. Susan Nittrouer, Ending the Lottery, 71 FLA. L. REV . FORUM 132
(2019).
5 See BARBARA BENNETT WOODHOUSE, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: THE TRAGEDY OF CHILDREN’S
RIGHTS FROM BEN FRANKLIN TO LIONEL TATE (2008) [hereinafter WOODHOUSE, HIDDEN IN PLAIN
SIGHT].
6 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7 For data on resegregation, see GARY ORFIELD, REVIVING THE GOAL OF AN INTEGRATED
SOCIETY: A 21ST CENTURY CHALLENGE (2009). Sean Reardon of the Stanford Center on Poverty and
Inequality conducts ongoing research on educational inequality and poverty. See Education,
STANFORD CTR. ON POVERTY & INEQUALITY, https://inequality.stanford.edu/cpi-research/area/
education [https://perma.cc/R6WH-72DM]. Brown is capable of being read in a far more radical way,
which I explore in research and work in progress, tentatively entitled “Radical Brown.”
8 See infra Part II.
9 Formally, citizenship and maturity are set at age eighteen, the age of adult status and the right to
vote. Yet because of the individualized aspect of equality rights, developmental support might extend
past age eighteen to ensure reaching independent citizenship, whether to complete necessary education
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These positive rights are connected to, but distinctive from, affirmative
rights claims of adults.10
Our constitutional obligation is that inequality not be reinscribed.
While children are not simply passive subjects of adults, their dependency
means that they neither choose their families nor their circumstances. They
are not sufficiently capable, for long periods of their youth, and are not
legally empowered, in most circumstances, to act for themselves.
The state’s responsibility to children, as an expression of society’s
collective responsibility, emanates both from the necessity of correcting
hierarchies among children that are of the state’s creation, as well as the
state’s affirmative obligation to ensure every child has the support needed to
develop to their maximum capacity and capability. The state’s obligation is
linked to its parens patriae role.11 In part, this is a corrective role linked to
the notion that the state should not harm children; indeed, it is responsible
to protect them from harm. When harm disproportionately impacts
children along lines of historic and continuing discrimination, the state’s
negative action (or inaction) is particularly egregious. The state’s
advantaging or privileging of other children, particularly those historically
and contemporaneously at the top of hierarchies among children, is equally
abhorrent.12 Privilege coexists and interacts with subordination; the
combination creates children’s hierarchies.
Children’s affirmative right is to that support necessary to achieve their
full potential and claim their rights of full citizenship and sociopolitical
participation on an equal footing.13 Their affirmative right of support is the
right to that support necessary to maximize their developmental capacity
and opportunity. The child’s right is not to a minimum or adequate level of
or to take account of circumstances like foster care or the needs of children with disabilities.
Independent citizenship does not preclude adult dependency (economic or otherwise).
10 Adult capacities are essential to realizing children’s rights. Even when not essential to achieve
children’s rights, adults have affirmative rights of their own. On the positive rights of adults, see, Frank
I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV.
7 (1969).
11 See infra Section III.B.3.
12 Identifying privilege within this structure is essential to debunk the myth of earned value that
replicates the ignorance of racial hierarchy. See generally Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege: Unpacking
the Invisible Knapsack, in WHITE PRIVILEGE AND MALE PRIVILEGE: A PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF COMING
TO SEE CORRESPONDENCES THROUGH WORK IN WOMEN ’S S TUDIES (1988); MARGARET A.
HAGERMAN, WHITE KIDS: GROWING UP WITH PRIVILEGE IN A RACIALLY DIVIDED AMERICA (2018).
13 See DOWD, REIMAGINING E QUALITY, supra note 3, at 136–67.
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support to reach average capacity, but rather to a fair opportunity to reach
their full developmental potential. This is an individualized right, attentive
to the individual needs and capacities of every child, to an equal chance in
life: full support during childhood to maximize developmental capacity to
the threshold of adulthood.14 Recognition of this constitutional obligation
would trigger structural change to achieve these rights.15 What is needed is
what I have called elsewhere a comprehensive New Deal for Children.16
Achieving children’s equality rights requires first, that inequality and
hierarchies due to subordinating government policies be dismantled.
Second, policies and systems must be created to ensure necessary supports
that ensure developmental equality. There must be an ongoing commitment
to foster positive support and equality among children who are born with
equal rights but in unequal contexts, as well as dealing with differences
linked to inherent capacities or developmental disabilities. The
implementation of children’s equality also must deal with the transitional
needs of children already on their developmental pathway who have been
subjected to developmental inequality, and adults who are hamstrung due
to hurdles placed in their path as children.17
My claim about children’s equality rights rests on a robust definition of
equality essential for equality to be meaningful, a foundation essential to our
democracy, to our very definition of ourselves and our country. The
constitutional argument is grounded in children’s difference, dependency,
and humanity, and the critical importance of equality to ensure that each
child has a fair, equal chance to succeed, and have the tools to be an
empowered social and political participant in our democracy. The argument
is also grounded in the inherent value of each child, as well as the value of

14 Id. See generally United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (“‘Inherent differences’
between men and women, . . . remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the members of
either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual’s opportunity.” (emphasis added)).
15 DOWD, REIMAGINING EQUALITY , supra note 3, at 136–67.
16 Id.
17 On complex disadvantage, see generally Richard Rothstein, The
Racial Achievement Gap,
Segregated Schools, and Segregated Neighborhoods—A Constitutional Insult, 6 RACE & SOC. PROBS.
(2014). On the collateral consequences of the juvenile justice system long past the direct consequences
of system involvement, see Sue Burrell, Collateral Consequences of Juvenile Court: Boulders on the Road
to Good Outcomes, in A NEW JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: TOTAL REFORM FOR A BROKEN SYSTEM 333
(Nancy E. Dowd ed., 2015) [hereinafter A NEW JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM].

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373324
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each person to society when they are developmentally supported and
contribute to the whole.
Children’s positive rights cannot be exercised in isolation from families
and communities, and require structural change, including economic
opportunities, housing, and a vibrant ecology18 for children’s developmental
trajectory. While we have a long tradition of constitutional support for
families, it is largely to prevent intrusion rather than to mandate responsive
state support.19 Our tradition of family privacy and privatizing responsibility
for children under the doctrine of “parental rights” has supported individual
parental responsibility for children’s development. Children’s equality
rights are not in conflict with parental or familial rights; they are in harmony
with them, and demand stronger support for all families, not simply the
privileging of some.20 The larger challenge is to ensure that the state acts
responsively, supportively, and with appreciation for diverse family forms
and culture, as opposed to intruding in a subordinating way to dictate to
families or to children.
The argument for children’s constitutional equality rights includes
how to define children as constitutional subjects and rights holders, as well
as challenging the notion that our Constitution is a charter only of negative
rights, rather than a guarantee of positive rights.21 Like race and gender
analysis, articulating children’s rights cannot be subject to an originalist
perspective, as that would bind us to an outdated, rejected notion of children
as property subject to patriarchal power and control.22 Instead, we must

18 On a positive, vibrant ecology, see infra discussion of Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, notes 233–
254 and accompanying text.
19 Compare Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), with DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
20 The relationship between parents, children, and the state is complex and not free of conflicts on
how to implement and sustain children’s equality, but with respect to equality rights their interests
align. With respect to other aspects of children’s rights, conflicts between parents and children may
easily be imagined but that does not undermine children’s claim of rights.
21 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 189.
22 The view of children at the time of the drafting of the original Constitution reflected the notion
of children as property. See generally Steven Mintz, Placing Children’s Rights in Historical Perspective,
44 CRIM. L. BULL. 2 (2008). Similar to the rejection of originalism with respect to race and gender views
at the time the original Constitution or amendments were drafted as inconsistent with overarching
constitutional principles; our view of children cannot be linked to this long-rejected idea of children
and their relationship to a patriarchal family.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373324
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begin theoretically with the recognition that children are constitutional
subjects that must be defined and evaluated in contemporary terms.
Children’s equality requires attention to their current inequality, and
who is at the bottom of children’s hierarchies. Overwhelmingly, the children
at the bottom reflect our persistent hierarchy of race: Black children and
their families are disproportionate in every negative indicator about
children.23 Race is further exacerbated by intersections with gender that
make particular inequalities specific to Black boys and Black girls.24 But
23 The child poverty rate, which continues to hover near twenty percent for all children, is highest
and most extreme among children from birth to age five. For Black children, the poverty rate is one in
three children for children from birth to age five, and near that rate for children from five to seventeen.
Native American children under five exceed a one in three poverty rate and represent the highest rate
among all racial groups of children. CHILDREN’S DEF. FUND, CHILD POVERTY IN AMERICA 2017:
NATIONAL ANALYSIS (2018), https://www.childrensdefense.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ChildPoverty-in-America-2017-National-Fact-Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7C9-HW57] [hereinafter
CHILD POVERTY IN AMERICA 2017: NATIONAL ANALYSIS]. The rate of deaths due to gun violence
among children and teens is shockingly high, over three thousand deaths in 2016, which translates to a
death about every three hours. Black children and teens are disproportionately the victims of gun
violence. CHILDREN’S DEF . FUND, CHILDREN’S DEFENSE FUND PROTECT CHILDREN NOT GUNS FACT
SHEET: 2016 CHILD GUN DEATHS (2018), https://www.childrensdefense.org/wp-content/uploads/
2018/08/cdf-protect-children-not-guns.pdf [https://perma.cc/TLS9-73AM]. On healthcare disparities,
see generally Alan Nelson, Unequal Treatment: Confronting Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health
Care, 94 J. NAT’L MED . ASS’N 666 (2002) (summary of congressionally requested study on healthcare
disparities). With respect to children’s healthcare disparities, see Glenn Flores, Techical Report—Racial
and Ethnic Disparities in the Health and Health Care of Children, 125 PEDIATRICS 979, 1014 (2010) (“A
comprehensive review of the literature revealed that racial/ethnic disparities in children’s health and
health care are quite extensive, pervasive, and persistent. Disparities were noted across the spectrum of
health and health care [and] . . . that racial/ethnic disparities are persisting or worsening over
time . . . .”). For an overall summary of educational disparities including inequalities in early childhood
education, disparities at kindergarten, and persisting achievement disparities, see generally A M.
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, ETHNIC AND RACIAL DISPARITIES IN EDUCATION: PSYCHOLOGY’S
CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNDERSTANDING AND REDUCING DISPARITIES (2012), https://www.apa.org/ed/
resources/racial-disparities.pdf [https://perma.cc/FH49-LK65]. Regarding achievement differences
specifically, see LAUREN MUSU-GILLETTE ET AL., NAT’L C TR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC., STATUS AND TRENDS IN THE EDUCATION OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC GROUPS 2017, at iv (2017),
https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2017/2017051.pdf [https://perma.cc/8UDU-59H4].
24 Black boys, for example, are disproportionate on measures of school discipline, referral to special
education, and exclusion from school, as well as disproportionate in the juvenile justice system both in
representation overall and in the deep end of the system. Nancy E. Dowd, Equality, Equity, and Dignity,
37 LAW & INEQ. 5 (2019) [hereinafter Dowd, Equality, Equity, and Dignity]. Black girls suffer from
similar disproportionalities but in ways unique to perceptions of them including issues of sexual
harassment and sexual assault. KIMBERLÉ WILLIAMS CRENSHAW ET AL., A FRICAN AM. POL’Y F ORUM,
BLACK GIRLS MATTER: PUSHED OUT, OVERPOLICED AND UNDERPROTECTED (2015),
www.atlanticphilanthropies.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/BlackGirlsMatter_Report.pdf
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Black children are not alone at the bottom. Poor white children, immigrant
children, Native American children, and other nonwhite children are also at
the bottom.25 In addition, physical and mental disabilities often steer
[https://perma.cc/8KNJ-UQPY]; REBECCA EPSTEIN ET AL., GEORGETOWN LAW CTR. ON POVERTY &
INEQUALITY, GIRLHOOD INTERRUPTED: THE ERASURE OF BLACK GIRLS’ CHILDHOOD (2017),
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/poverty-inequality-center/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2017/08/
girlhood-interrupted.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6SD-L6EN] (perceiving Black girls as less “innocent” or
childlike, thus less in need of support, more likely to be viewed as older and deserving of harsher
consequences for perceived misbehavior, linked to data on discipline, school achievement, and juvenile
justice system involvement).
25 Supra text accompanying note 23 (poverty, education, health, and violence data include high
rates for Hispanic and Native American children); Janelle Jones, One-Third of Native American and
African American Children Are (Still) in Poverty, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Sept. 20, 2017),
https://www.epi.org/publication/one-third-of-native-american-and-african-american-children-arestill-in-poverty [https://perma.cc/S9AR-VYKL] (despite overall poverty rate declines for children,
Native American children were the only group to see no decrease in poverty rate); Michelle Sarche &
Paul Spicer, Poverty and Health Disparities for American Indian and Alaska Native Children: Current
Knowledge and Future Prospects, 1136 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 126, 127, 129–31 (2008) (noting
variation among tribal groups in poverty rates with some tribes at forty percent poverty rate and
significant health disparities between Native and non-Native children); EDUC. TR., THE STATE OF
EDUCATION FOR NATIVE STUDENTS (2013), https://edtrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/
NativeStudentBrief_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/8E5P-T3CE]; American Indian Statistics, HARV. U.
NATIVE AM. PROGRAM STAT. PROJECT, http://www.hunapstatisticsproject.info/TribeCategory/
AllAmericanIndianPopulation.htm [https://perma.cc/P7WJ-GW2P] (data on the intersecting systems
of housing, education, employment, and health). On immigrant children, as well as the high poverty
rate of recent immigrants, see Immigrant Children, CHILD TRENDS (Dec. 28, 2018),
https://www.childtrends.org/indicators/immigrant-children [https://perma.cc/FA9U-MAQ8]; see
also Mary Tamer, The Education of Immigrant Children, HARV. GRADUATE SCH. EDUC. (Dec. 11, 2014),
https://www.gse.harvard.edu/news/uk/14/12/education-immigrant-children [https://perma.cc/4F7XEKKG] (summarizing specific education issues of immigrant children unaddressed by most schoools).
Hispanic children are the fastest growing group of children in the United States, currently constituting
twenty-five percent of children and estimated to be one third of American children by 2050. They suffer
from high poverty rates, low educational achievement, health disparities, and housing inadequacies. See
generally PATRICIA FOXEN & MARK MATHER, NAT’L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, TOWARD A MORE
EQUITABLE FUTURE: THE TRENDS AND CHALLENGES FACING AMERICA’S LATINO CHILDREN (2016),
http://publications.unidosus.org/handle/123456789/1627 [https://perma.cc/NUG4-FZBB]; see also
DAVID MURPHEY ET AL., CHILD TRENDS, AMERICA’S HISPANIC CHILDREN: GAINING GROUND,
LOOKING FORWARD (2014), https://www.childtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/201438AmericaHispanicChildren.pdf [https://perma.cc/B427-B2XZ]; NAT’L RES. CTR. ON HISP . CHILD. &
FAMILIES, http://www.hispanicresearchcenter.org [https://perma.cc/84GK-Y24U]. With respect to low
income White children, while Whites are least likely to live in poverty, the sheer number of White
children in poverty exceeds any other racial group, 12.1 million children in 2012. NAT’L C TR. FOR
CHILDREN IN POVERTY, MORE WHITE CHILDREN IN LOW-INCOME FAMILIES THAN ANY OTHER
RACIAL GROUP (2012), http://www.nccp.org/media/releases/release_138.html [https://perma.cc/
MHA2-PWLU].
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children toward the bottom, especially if they are already there because of
race, gender, and class identities.26 A strong doctrine of children’s equality
rights must be framed in a way that its core measure is the dismantling of
hierarchies and the provision of support for every child to achieve to their
capacity. It is essential to keep children of color at the center of the analysis
rather than analyzing children in a whitewashed way.27 Race is not the only
hierarchy, but it is one that is visibly inscribed and places children in a lower
rung on the hierarchy. It is critical to address and identify the path for other
identities that currently correlate with subordination and inequality.
Children’s rights require dismantling barriers to their equality (classic
negative constitutional rights) but also implementing positive rights to
support in order for children to achieve real equality. That right is only
possible if every child is provided the developmental support necessary to
maximize their individual potential and opportunity. I focus on
developmental equality because it is critical to children’s life chances and
opportunities.28

26 There are gaps in achievement levels and graduation rates that have persisted over time. See, e.g.,
STEPHANIE ARAGON, EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES, CLOSING THE ACHIEVEMENT GAP FOR
STUDENTS WITH SPECIFIC LEARNING DISABILITIES (2016), https://www.ecs.org/wp-content/uploads/
Information-Request_Closing-the-Achievement-Gap_August-2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S6YSTAXL].
27 I am indebted to Robin Lenhardt for the concept of “whitewashing.” R.A. Lenhardt, The Color of
Kinship, 102 IOWA L. REV. 2071 (2017) [hereinafter Lenhardt, The Color of Kinship]; Robin A. Lenhardt,
Race, Dignity, and the Right to Marry, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 53, 53–54 (2015) [hereinafter Lenhardt,
Race, Dignity, and the Right to Marry].

Even as it secures rights for LGBT Americans, Obergefell [v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)]
crafts a whitewashed version of marriage and dignity inconsistent with the actual experience
of African Americans and other minorities with marriage. . . . [L]egal marriage in this
country has, in fact, too often not enhanced dignity for African Americans and other
minority groups. . . . [I]t has very often diminished black dignity and citizenship. Even
more[,] as . . . growing evidence of the cumulative disadvantage and despair that marks
African American life make plain—marriage, without more, is unlikely to secure black
belonging anytime soon.
Id. (footnote omitted).
28 The affirmative right to developmental support is different from the analysis of other scholars
who have focused on children’s procedural rights, participation rights, or rights in relation to parents
or other caregivers. See, e.g., Anne C. Dailey, Children’s Constitutional Rights, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2099
(2011); Emily Buss, Constitutional Fidelity Through Children’s Rights, 2004 SUP. C T. REV. 355 (2004)
[hereinafter Buss, Constitutional Fidelity]; see also Ursula Kilkelly, Youth Courts and Children’s Rights:
The Irish Experience, 8 YOUTH JUST. 39 (2008).
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This Article is divided into three Parts. Part I describes hierarchies
among children and the model of developmental equality. Existing
inequalities among children generate my focus on their equal developmental
rights. Part II defines what children’s equality should mean by arguing that
it encompasses three intertwined concepts: equality, equity, and dignity.29
Part III links this robust definition of equality to a framework of children’s
rights. Children have unique claims to positive rights and affirmative
demands on the state based on their inherent humanity, their need for
developmental support to become full and equal social and political citizens
by adulthood, and their dependency and vulnerabilities. I identify existing
threads of constitutional jurisprudence that support children’s rights.
Children’s rights might generate constitutional litigation claims, but more
productively, children’s rights would be used to implement policy in support
of children’s affirmative needs within the broader constitutional role of the
legislative branch.30 Within a children’s rights framework, implementation
of children’s equality is not only possible, but essential, to a world fit for all
children.31
I. CHILDREN’S HIERARCHIES AND DEVELOPMENTAL EQUALITY
A.

Inequalities Among Children

By almost every measure, American children are highly unequal, a
stratification process that begins almost at birth, and arguably starts even

Dowd, Equality, Equity, and Dignity, supra note 24.
The broad scope of legislative constitutional interpretation and power is the focus of Goodwin
Liu with respect to constitutional rights to equal education. Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and
National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330 (2006) [hereinafter Liu, Education, Equality, and National
Citizenship]. Aoife Nolan makes a sophisticated, nuanced evaluation and argument for the judicial role
in effectuating children’s socio-economic rights. AOIFE NOLAN, CHILDREN’S SOCIO-ECONOMIC
RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND THE COURTS 220–59 (2011) [hereinafter NOLAN, CHILDREN’S SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS].
31 “We want a world fit for children, because a world fit for us is a world fit for everyone.” U NITED
NATIONS CHILDREN’S FUND, A WORLD FIT FOR US: THE CHILDREN’S STATEMENT FROM THE U.N.
SPECIAL SESSION ON CHILDREN: FIVE YEARS ON 2 (2007) [hereinafter A WORLD FIT FOR US],
https://www.unicef.org/worldfitforchildren/files/A_World_Fit_for_Us.pdf [https://perma.cc/77HCVAZQ].
29
30
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earlier, due to differences in prenatal care and support.32 An astounding
twenty percent live in poverty, and a significant number near poverty, and
that fact alone correlates with highly negative developmental outcomes.33
Moreover, the poverty rate, already high, grossly underestimates children’s
needs.34 Many children have low quality health insurance.35 More
importantly, they suffer from a negative differential with respect to the social
determinants of health that translate into higher rates of certain illnesses,
such as asthma, linked to poor or inadequate housing or toxic factors in their
environment.36 A startling percentage of children do not have enough to eat,
and what they do eat is not healthy, due to their parents’ inadequate
resources to afford a healthy diet.37 For a significant number of children,
their housing is inadequate, unhealthy, or unsafe, and income instability
means they move frequently.38
32 “African American women are three to four times more likely to die from childbirth than nonHispanic white women, and socioeconomic status, education, and other factors do not protect against
this disparity.” THERESA CHALHOUB & KELLY RIMAR, C TR. FOR A M. PROGRESS, THE HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM
AND
RACIAL
DISPARITIES
IN
MATERNAL
MORTALITY
1
(2018),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/reports/2018/05/10/450577/health-care-systemracial-disparities-maternal-mortality [https://perma.cc/8TH2-CESS]. Similarly, infant mortality is
highest among African American infants. Infant Mortality by Race in the United States, KIDS COUNT
DATA CTR., https://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/tables/21-infant-mortality-by-race#detailed/1
[https://perma.cc/7HF9-ACWM].
33 CHILD POVERTY IN AMERICA 2017: NATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 23. On developmental
correlations with poverty, see DOWD , REIMAGINING EQUALITY, supra note 3, at 11–15.
34 On the scope of the underestimate, see Child Poverty, NAT’L C TR. FOR CHILDREN IN POVERTY,
http://www.nccp.org/topics/childpoverty.html [https://perma.cc/6NG4-P72L].
35 Even though nearly ninety-five percent of very young children have some health insurance, the
quality of that insurance varies significantly. Health Care Coverage for Children, CHILD TRENDS,
https://www.childtrends.org/indicators/health-care-coverage [https://perma.cc/E447-NHJG].
36 See Flores, supra note 23. For the example of asthma and its connection to healthcare
determinants, see Jodi Siegel et al., Benefits of Pediatric Medical-Legal Partnerships, 71 FLA. L. REV .
FORUM 145 (2019).
37 An estimated one in six children suffers from food insecurity. FEEDING A MERICA, CHILD FOOD
INSECURITY (2018), https://www.feedingamerica.org/sites/default/files/research/map-the-meal-gap/
2016/2016-map-the-meal-gap-child-food-insecurity.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8GD-6S3F]. For the
significant impact of food insecurity and poor nutrition on development, see Diana F. Jyoti et al., Food
Insecurity Affects School Children’s Academic Performance, Weight Gain, and Social Skills, 135 J.
NUTRITION 2831 (2005).
38 On the detrimental impact of housing inadequacy, moving, and youth homelessness, see OFFICE
OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM
UNHEALTHY HOMES AND HOUSING INSTABILITY (2014), https://www.huduser.gov/portal/periodicals/
em/fall14/highlight3.html [https://perma.cc/L2MT-A62T]. On the developmental impact of housing,
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Children’s care and educational environments are highly unequal. It is
commonplace for very young children to be cared for while their parents
work,39 but the quality of that care, and its capability to contribute to child
development, is highly stratified.40 High quality child care is correlated with
cognitive development, language development, math skills, social skills, and
the ability of young children to self-regulate.41 The distribution of high
quality care is highly racially stratified, reflecting factors of residential
segregation and disparate resources.42 Programs like Head Start, which
provide high quality care, nevertheless serve only thirty percent of the
children who qualify.43 Preschool or prekindergarten, prior to the beginning
of compulsory education, similarly is highly uneven in quality and is by no
means universally available.44 The average percent of state enrollment of
four-year-olds is thirty-three percent, with the highest enrollment in only a
few states surpassing seventy percent.45 Programs designed to reach three-

see REBEKAH LEVINE COLEY ET AL., MACARTHUR FOUND., POOR QUALITY HOUSING IS TIED TO
CHILDREN’S EMOTIONAL AND BEHAVIORAL PROBLEMS (2013), https://www.macfound.org/media/
files/HHM_Policy_Research_Brief_-_Sept_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QJT-9KHW].
39 Sixty percent of preschool children are in childcare centers. Marianne M. Hillemeier et al.,
Quality Disparities in Child Care for At-Risk Children: Comparing Head Start and Non-Head Start
Settings, 17 MATERNAL CHILD HEALTH J. 180, 180 (2013).
40 Id. at 180–81. See also regarding differences in quality of care, Aaron Loewenberg, Study Finds
Large Quality Differences in Early Education Settings, NEW AMERICA (June 6, 2016),
https://www.newamerica.org/education-policy/edcentral/qualitystudy [https://perma.cc/E6T2-B722].
On the difficulty of getting access to care, see also Jonathan Cohn, Finding Decent Child Care Is a Huge
Struggle for Some Families, New Report Shows, HUFFPOST (Dec. 6, 2018, 7:30 AM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/finding-licensed-child-care-report_us_
5c089013e4b069028dc66697 [https://perma.cc/3RGA-SZBY] (summarizing report by Rasheed Malik
et al., America’s Child Care Deserts in 2018, C TR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 6, 2018, 7:30 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/early-childhood/reports/2018/12/06/461643/americaschild-care-deserts-2018 [https://perma.cc/QU94-WD5Q] (showing half the country has too few
licensed care spots in comparison to demand. This study does not evaluate the quality of care but simply
the availability of licensed care facilities.)).
41 Hillemeier et al., supra note 39.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 ALLISON H. FRIEDMAN-KRAUSS ET AL ., NAT’L INST. FOR EARLY EDUC . RESEARCH, THE STATE OF
PRESCHOOL 2017, at 5 (2018), http://nieer.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/YB2017_ExecutiveSummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/TS3Z-PSGJ]. One of the section titles of this report says it all:
disparities exist and are growing. Id.
45 Id. Nineteen states enroll fewer than ten percent of four-year-olds. Id.
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year-olds are even less common.46 Just a handful of states have universal
programs intended to reach all children.47 Even more significant than this
uneven pattern of enrollment is the uneven quality of prekindergarten
programs. The quality of prekindergarten ranges significantly, with widely
different per child expenditures.48 Few programs meet high quality
standards, and as with early childcare, the level of quality is stratified by race
and class.49
These differences are particularly consequential to the early years of
development, from birth to five.50 This is a period of enormous
development, due to explosive brain growth, maturing, and geometric
increases in complexity, all of which are strongly affected by context.51 So,
for example, differences in language development have been tracked as early
as eighteen months, linked to differences in parental circumstances, styles of
interaction, and education.52 In other words, inequalities emerge early not
due to adversity but due to differences in context over which parents and
children have little or no control.53 Additional inputs and supports at this
early stage can have significant effects. Those can include early home visiting
programs to support all new parents, efforts to improve the social
determinants of heath pre-natally to reduce the incidence of low birthweight
and support healthy births, robust pediatric care, high quality childcare, and
high-quality prekindergarten. All of these supports help children otherwise
Id.
Id. at 23.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 6. For example, spending in real dollars declined from 2002–2017, and interstate spending
varied substantially. Id. Most programs do not meet quality standards, and in some of the largest states
serving the greatest proportion of children, the shortfall is dramatic. Id.; see also U.S. DEP ’T OF EDUC.,
A MATTER OF EQUITY: PRESCHOOL IN AMERICA (2015), https://www2.ed.gov/documents/earlylearning/matter-equity-preschool-america.pdf [https://perma.cc/4JWK-MRE7]. On inequities by
class, which reflect racial disparities as well, see Jennifer LoCasale-Crouch et al., Observed Classroom
Quality Profiles in State-Funded Pre-Kindergarten Programs and Associations with Teacher, Program,
and Classroom Characteristics, 22 EARLY CHILDHOOD RES. Q. 3 (2007).
50 See generally Joanna L. Grossman, The Seeds of Early Childhood, 71 F LA. L. REV . FORUM 117
(2019); HARV. U.: C TR. ON THE DEVELOPING CHILD , https://developingchild.harvard.edu
[https://perma.cc/E6H3-JD75] (summarizing research on birth to age five).
51 Grossman, supra note 50; HARV. U.: C TR. ON THE DEVELOPING CHILD , supra note 50.
52 Anne Fernald et al., SES Differences in Language Processing Skill and Vocabulary Are Evident at
18 Months, 16 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 234 (2013); Patricia K. Kuhl, Early Language Learning and
Literacy: Neuroscience Implications for Education, 5 MIND, BRAIN, & EDUC. 128 (2011).
53 Kuhl, supra note 52.
46
47
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relegated to the bottom to instead sustain their equality so that they enter
school at relative equality and readiness.54
We also know that adverse experiences can create or add to
developmental differences if they are unaccompanied by support to build
children’s resilience.55 Thus, added to developmental differences in context,
toxic adversity greatly magnifies differences among children because it has
the potential, if not countered with resilience support, to impact cognitive
and emotional functioning that affects how well children do in school.56 In
early childhood, vulnerabilities and exponential growth make adversity
particularly problematic, although adversity has an impact throughout
childhood.57 In the last two decades, research on the impact of early adversity
has been conducted under the framework of the Adverse Childhood
Experiences (ACEs) framework, which identifies particular adverse factors
that have long term health effects and early cognitive impacts on learning,
achievement, and educational outcomes.58 The ACEs research indicates that

54 High quality childcare has long-term effects as demonstrated by the Perry Preschool research.
See, e.g., James J. Heckman et al., The Rate of Return to the High/Scope Perry Preschool Program (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15471, 2009), https://www.nber.org/papers/w15471.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XP4V-X8M2]. On the value of home health and visiting nurse programs, see M.
Rebecca Kilburn & Jill S. Cannon, Home Visiting and Use of Infant Health Care: A Randomized Clinical
Trial, 139 PEDIATRICS 1 (2017); Council on Child and Adolescent Health, The Role of Home-Visitation
Programs in Improving Health Outcomes for Children and Families, 101 PEDIATRICS 486 (1998).
55 Nancy E. Dowd, Radical ACEs: Building Resilience and Triggering Structural Change, 71 F LA. L.
REV. F ORUM 80 (2019) [hereinafter Dowd, Radical ACEs]. For comprehensive work on the Adverse
Childhood Experiences framework, see the Centers for Disease Control website on the framework and
research, Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs), C TRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/acestudy/index.html [https://perma.cc/A3L6-EZJW].
56 Dowd, Radical ACEs, supra note 55.
57 Id.
58 About the CDC-Kaiser ACE Study, CTRS . FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/childabuseandneglect/acestudy/about.html?CDC_AA_
refVal=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cdc.gov%2Fviolenceprevention%2Facestudy%2Fabout.html
[https://perma.cc/SQZ3-RNKB]; Vincent J. Felitti et al., Relationship of Childhood Abuse and
Household Dysfunction to Many of the Leading Causes of Death in Adults, 14 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED .
245, 245–46 (1998); ROBERT ANDA, NAT’L ASS’N FOR CHILDREN OF ALCOHOLICS, THE HEALTH AND
SOCIAL IMPACT OF GROWING UP WITH ALCOHOL ABUSE AND RELATED ADVERSE CHILDHOOD
EXPERIENCES: THE HUMAN AND ECONOMIC COSTS OF THE STATUS QUO (2018), https://nacoa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/04/The-Health-Social-Impact-NACoA.pdf [https://perma.cc/LW8K-MEAB];
AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, ADVERSE CHILDHOOD EXPERIENCES AND THE LIFELONG CONSEQUENCES
OF
TRAUMA
(2014),
https://www.aap.org/en-us/documents/ttb_aces_consequences.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AD9M-UTGU].
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adversity is common for all children, but high levels of adversity if left
unaddressed can have lifetime negative consequences.59 Apart from ACEs,
other adversity factors with known negative correlations to child
development include poverty and racism because of their strong links to
socio-economic and cultural barriers and challenges.60
Children’s inequalities cannot be viewed in isolation. Children are
embedded in families, and families similarly are not isolated but function
within neighborhoods and communities that interact particularly with the
world of work. Whether work provides a sufficient degree of economic
security and income directly relates to children’s outcomes. The balance, or
lack of it, between work and family also has a strong impact on children.61 In
addition, children are affected by the degree of support of the family forms
within which they develop. So, for instance, lack of support for non-marital
families is keenly felt by children and increases their subordination along a
hierarchy of children.62 Neighborhood characteristics similarly affect the
degree of support and opportunities for children and their families, and the
extent of community resources.63

59 Nancy E. Dowd, Straight out of Compton: Developmental Equality and a Critique of the Compton
School Litigation, 45 CAP . U. L. REV. 199 (2017) [hereinafter Dowd, Straight out of Compton].
60 DOWD, REIMAGINING EQUALITY , supra note 3, at 9–18.
61 For an overview of work-family scholarship and key trends, see Suzanne M. Bianchi & Melissa
A. Milkie, Work and Family Research in the First Decade of the 21st Century, 72 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
705 (2010); JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN AND CLASS
MATTER 1–11 (2010). For an in-depth look at work-family issues in low income families, see Stephanie
Bornstein, Work, Family, and Discrimination at the Bottom of the Ladder, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. &
POL’Y 1, 6–14 (2012).
62 Lenhardt, Race, Dignity, and the Right to Marry, supra note 27.
63 The Washington state ACEs study is an example of this, recognizing the importance of
community characteristics, not just child characteristics. CHRISTOPHER BLODGETT, WASH . STATE
UNIV., ACES IN HEAD START CHILDREN AND IMPACT ON DEVELOPMENT 1 (2014),
https://s3.wp.wsu.edu/uploads/sites/2101/2015/03/ACEs-in-Head-Start-Children-and-Impact-onDevelopment-1-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8CR-W39D]; Christopher Blodgett, Adopting ACEs
Screening and Assessment in in [sic] Child Serving Systems 6–7 (Wash. State Univ., Working Paper
7/30/12, 2012), https://del-public-files.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Complex-Trauma-ResearchACE-Screening-and-Assessment-in-Child-Serving-Systems-7-12-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QM87DRG]. Another perspective is provided by opportunity mapping, such as that developed by the Kirwin
Institute, also applied in Washington state. JASON REECE ET AL., KIRWAN INST. FOR THE STUDY OF RACE
AND ETHNICITY, OHIO STATE UNIV., THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: MAPPING TO PROMOTE
EQUITABLE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND FAIR HOUSING IN KING COUNTY, WA (2010),
http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/docs/KingCounty.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VGS-FL5C].
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Once children reach school age, the educational system is critical to
children’s development. Yet the inequalities of early childhood are
frequently exacerbated rather than addressed and resolved.64 Differences in
school readiness frequently widen into differences of achievement.65
Moreover, if the population of children in particular schools presents unique
needs that are left unaddressed, it may affect learning for all children.66
Apart from differences that children bring to the schoolhouse door,
differences between schools are stark. Schools are not equal in resources or
outcomes.67 It is not insignificant where a child goes to school; a child is not
guaranteed an equal education irrespective of the school they attend. The
quality of education varies radically from school to school. Differences of
resources and funding (even if one measures equality from an equal
resources definition) exist school-to-school within districts; between
districts in a single state; and between states.68 School funding is linked to
property taxes, and thus to wealth. The allocation of resources by identified
needs also varies among schools.69 Schools are highly segregated by race and
class, and educational outcomes follow those hierarchies.70 Differences in
measures of objective factors, “bricks and mortar,” or the range of dollar
resources, do not capture additional differences within school walls and

64

See, e.g., PEDRO A. NOGUERA, THE TROUBLE WITH BLACK BOYS . . . AND OTHER REFLECTIONS

ON RACE, EQUITY, AND THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC EDUCATION (2008).

Id.; see also DOWD , REIMAGINING EQUALITY, supra note 3, at 19–27.
See, for example, the Compton school district. Dowd, Straight out of Compton, supra note 59, at
222–27 (summarizing the Compton school litigation).
67 For a sampling of education scholarship, see, for example, Liu, Education, Equality, and National
Citizenship, supra note 30; William S. Koski, Beyond Dollars? The Promises and Pitfalls of the Next
Generation of Educational Rights Litigation, 117 COLUM. L REV. 1897 (2017); Erwin Chemerinsky,
Making Schools More Separate and Unequal: Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle District
No. 1, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV . 633 (2014); Noah B. Lindell, Old Dog, New Tricks: Title VI and Teacher
Equity, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 189 (2016); Lauren A. Webb, Educational Opportunity for All: Reducing
Intradistrict Funding Disparities, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2169 (2017).
68 Webb, supra note 67.
69 Id.
70 On the resegregation of schools since Brown v. Board of Education was decided in 1954, see GARY
ORFIELD ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT/PROYECTO DERECHOS CIVILES, BROWN AT 62: SCHOOL
SEGREGATION BY RACE, POVERTY AND STATE (2016), https://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12education/integration-and-diversity/brown-at-62-school-segregation-by-race-poverty-and-state/
Brown-at-62-final-corrected-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HDN-R4DX]; Sheldon Berman, The
Resegregation of America’s Schools, 11 SCH. ADMIN. 14, 14 (2013) (discussing the value of integration
and the record of resegregation).
65
66
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within classrooms.71 For example, the level of support for children in the
programs designed for the most gifted of students may be unequal due to the
biases of teachers.72 The bottom line is unequal education that hardly
provides each child with an equal opportunity to develop to their potential.73
Children may behave in school or on the streets in ways that bring them
into contact with police or other authority figures, and with the juvenile
justice system. The policing and justice systems should be a support to
children and family, ensuring their security and safety, and the well-being of
children who interact with them. Those systems should be developmentally
informed, structured with the knowledge of child development particularly
in adolescence.74 Yet both policing and the justice system are profoundly
negative systems for children generally, and especially for some children
who are over policed and under protected, or even threatened, by police.75
The presence of police in schools has exacerbated and expanded this
negative impact.76 The juvenile justice system is profoundly negative
developmentally, with its rehabilitative mission limited or non-existent in
many states, so that ironically the system becomes a link to, rather than a
deterrent from, adult criminal activity.77 It is also a highly unequal system in
terms of who is there: predominantly boys, and predominantly boys of
color.78 Because it is structured (however negatively) around boys, it also

71 Sharon E. Rush, Protecting the Dignity and Equality of Children: The Importance of Integrated
Schools, 20 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 73 (2010) [hereinafter Rush, Protecting the Dignity and Equality
of Children]; Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Sharing Space: Why Racial Goodwill Isn’t Enough, 32 CONN. L.
REV. 1 (1999).
72 CARLA SHEDD, UNEQUAL CITY: RACE, SCHOOLS , AND PERCEPTIONS OF INJUSTICE (2015).
73 Indeed, the pattern of inequality is particularly strong for Black boys, who have a pattern of low
achievement, a high rate of discipline and identification of learning disability, and a high rate of referral
to special education. Nancy E. Dowd, Black Boys Matter: Developmental Equality, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV .
47, 83–91 (2016) [hereinafter Dowd, Black Boys Matter].
74 James Bell, Child Well Being: Toward a Fair and Equitable Public Safety Strategy for the New
Century, in A NEW JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 17, at 23.
75 Id.; see also VICTOR M. RIOS, PUNISHED : P OLICING THE LIVES OF BLACK AND LATINO B OYS
(2011).
76 Jason P. Nance, Students, Police, and the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 93 W ASH. U. L. REV. 919
(2016).
77 For a broad range of critiques of the existing system, see JUSTICE FOR KIDS: KEEPING KIDS OUT
OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM (Nancy E. Dowd ed., 2011) [hereinafter J USTICE FOR KIDS].
78 Id.
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works a separate, additional harm to girls.79 The juvenile justice system, with
all these drawbacks, is also frequently a default mental health system for kids
in the absence of available mental healthcare.80
Another negative system for kids is the foster care/child welfare system.
For the children who come within its jurisdiction, the outcomes are
predominantly negative.81 Children in foster care are less likely to achieve
academically, more likely to fail to complete their education, and more likely
to cross over into difficulties with the juvenile justice system.82 Their removal
from their families frequently means a lack of family support or
improvement in their developmental path.83 The harms and abuse that cause
children to come into the system are made worse, not better; and the degree
of developmental support is inadequate. Similar to the juvenile justice
system, the likelihood of coming within this system is disproportionately
high for children of color.84
Available economic supports for families are meager and inadequate at
the low end of the income scale.85 This is a system of temporary support that
makes transition to a permanent, adequate standard of living difficult, even
in times of employment opportunity.86 The structure of supports (or lack of
them) for the poor is significant when compared with high end tax support
for middle and upper income families.87 The inadequacies of economic

79 Lawanda Ravoira & Vanessa Patino, Girl Matters: Unfinished Work, in JUSTICE FOR KIDS, supra
note 77, at 157.
80 David R. Katner, Delinquency, Due Process, and Mental Health: Presuming Youth Incompetency,
in A NEW JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 17, at 104.
81 Leslie Joan Harris, Challenging the Overuse of Foster Care and Disrupting the Path to Delinquency
and Prison, in JUSTICE FOR KIDS, supra note 77, at 62 [hereinafter Harris, Challenging the Overuse of
Foster Care].
82 The data is dismal on educational outcomes, school disruption, disciplinary actions, and
crossover into delinquency. See LEGAL C TR. FOR FOSTER CARE & EDUC., FOSTERING SUCCESS IN
EDUCATION: NATIONAL FACTSHEET ON THE EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES OF CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE
(2018).
83 Harris, Challenging the Overuse of Foster Care, supra note 81.
84 CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, FOSTER CARE STATISTICS 2017, at 8 www.childwelfare.gov/
pubs/factsheets/foster [https://perma.cc/SHR9-RDXU].
85 Wendy A. Bach, The Hyperregulatory State: Women, Race, Poverty, and Support, 25 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 317 (2014).
86 Id.
87 See Susannah Camic Tahk, The Tax War on Poverty, 56 ARIZ. L. REV . 791 (2014), for a discussion
of the limited benefits to the poor from the tax system.
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support are exacerbated by the limitations of the child support system, to the
detriment of children.88
Inequalities are not unique to the United States. Hierarchies are present
in most countries, including rich countries.89 Given the wealth of the United
States as a whole, however, the scope and severity of children’s inequalities
place the United States significantly below comparable industrialized
nations.90
B.

Developmental Equality

As the patterns of differences among children demonstrate, the
hierarchies among children are linked to identities. Especially stark are racial
hierarchies.91 Closely correlated to the Black/white binary of children’s
hierarchies are those of other children of color, Native American children,
and immigrant children.92 Among Hispanic immigrant children, for
88 See Daniel L. Hatcher, Remembering Anti-Essentialism: Relationship Dynamics Study and
Resulting Policy Considerations Impacting Low-Income Mothers, Fathers, and Children, 35 LAW & INEQ.
239 (2017), for a discussion of child support inadequacies, especially for mothers, and the negative
outcomes from pursuing low income fathers, as well as overall problems with the child support system.
89 JOHN HUDSON & S TEFAN KÜHNER, UNICEF OFFICE OF RESEARCH-INNOCENTI, INNOCENTI
REPORT CARD 13: FAIRNESS FOR CHILDREN: A LEAGUE TABLE OF INEQUALITY IN CHILD WELL-BEING
IN RICH COUNTRIES (2016) [hereinafter HUDSON & KÜHNER, INNOCENTI REPORT CARD]. The report
investigates four categories of child well-being in forty-one Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) countries: income, education, health, and life satisfaction. The report not
only identifies the condition of children at the bottom, but also how far below the median those children
fall.
90 Id. The United States, compared to other OECD countries, is thirtieth in income inequality;
tenth in education inequality; fourteenth in health inequality; and twenty-first in life satisfaction. The
U.S. rank overall is eighteenth. Id. One set of scholars has suggested that spending an additional one
percent of the U.S. budget would substantially improve outcomes for children. John Hills, The Blair
Government and Child Poverty: An Extra One Percent for Children in the United Kingdom, in ONE
PERCENT FOR THE KIDS: NEW POLICIES, BRIGHTER FUTURES FOR AMERICA’S CHILDREN 156 (Isabel
Sawhill ed., 2003). For 2017, the Urban Institute estimates spending on children as a percentage of the
federal budget was nine percent, or $375 billion. Public Spending on Children in Five Charts, URB. INST.
(July 18, 2018), https://apps.urban.org/features/public-spending-on-children [https://perma.cc/
5GDE-VGP5].
91 See supra text accompanying notes 27–31.
92 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. Patricia Snyder & Maureen Conroy, Core Constructs
in Federal Statutes for Young Children with or at Risk for Disabilities and Their Families: Implications for
Comprehensive Early Childhood Policies and Systems, 71 FLA. L. REV . FORUM 61 (2019); see CHRISTINE
JOHNSON-STAUB, C TR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, EQUITY STARTS EARLY: ADDRESSING RACIAL
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example, there is a disproportionately high rate of poverty.93 Hispanic
children, whether American born or immigrants, are least likely to be
enrolled in preschool of all racial groups and likely to be lower in school
readiness.94 Class hierarchies, which often exacerbate racial hierarchies, are
also dramatic among children.95 Gender is another marker, with distinctive
patterns of subordination for boys96 and girls,97 and a separate hierarchy for
those who do not identify on a gender binary.98 Finally, the identification of
children at risk with or identified with disabilities is also subject to

INEQUITIES IN CHILD CARE AND EARLY EDUCATION POLICY (2017), https://www.clasp.org/sites/
default/files/publications/2017/12/2017_EquityStartsEarly_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/ER3C-ACL8].
93 Tania Maria Caballero et al., Adverse Childhood Experiences Among Hispanic Children in Immigrant
Families Versus U.S.-Native Families, 140 PEDIATRICS 1 (2017). Interestingly, immigrant children had a 200%
higher rate of poverty than native-born Hispanic children, who already have a high rate of poverty, close to fifty
percent; but immigrant Hispanic children had a lower rate of ACEs. Id.
94 “Hispanic three- and four-year-olds are less likely than White children to be prepared
academically for Kindergarten, and less likely than other racial/ethnic groups to be enrolled in
preschool or Head Start programs (63 percent not enrolled).” READYNATION, THE CASE FOR
INVESTING
IN
AMERICA’S
HISPANIC
YOUNG
CHILDREN
2
(2015),
https://strongnation.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/123/803cd1b5-82e5-483c-9f42a410f71c6c63.pdf?1470542120&inline;%20filename=%22Hispanic%20Brief_RN_NAT.pdf%22
[https://perma.cc/SP4R-GYLC]; see also Ray Collins & Rose Ribeiro, Toward an Early Care and
Education Agenda for Hispanic Children, 6 EARLY CHILDHOOD RES. & PRAC. (2004).
95 HUDSON & KÜHNER, INNOCENTI REPORT CARD, supra note 89.
96 DOWD, REIMAGINING EQUALITY, supra note 3, at 19–50 (example of Black boys). See NANCY E.
DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION: MALE SUBORDINATION AND PRIVILEGE 73–100 (2010), for a discussion
of the areas in which boys generally are disadvantaged.
97 See, for example, EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 24; Fanna Gamal, Good Girls: Gender-Specific
Interventions in Juvenile Court, 35 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 228 (2018), for a discussion of girls’
inequalities. See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Introduction to Symposium on Toward a Feminist
Theory of the State, 35 LAW & INEQ. 255 (2017).
98 See Kristin Zimmerman & Linda Shuhaiber, The Limits of Being Transgendered, 1 THEMIS: RES .
J. JUST. STUD . & FORENSIC SCI. 35 (2013); Vivek Divan et al., Transgender Social Inclusion and Equality:
A Pivotal Path to Development, 19 J. INT’L AIDS SOC’Y 1 (2016), for a discussion of transgender
challenges.
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hierarchy99 to the extent those disabilities are identified, supported, and their
developmental capacity is maximized.100
One observer bluntly refers to this known pattern of children’s
hierarchies as creating an “Ovarian Lottery” for children: the luck of being
born into a particular family.101 Such blatant inequality amidst a
commitment to the principle of equality suggests a rigid system of
stratification that defines equality by the record of the exception, rather than
the patterns of the rule.102 If it is possible to transcend one’s draw in the
lottery, then that demonstrates the existence of equal opportunity. But for
many children, the lottery defines their chances. This rule of hierarchy is no
different in effect than systems of stigma identifying children by race, the
marital status of their parents, or assumptions of their mental capacity.103
The identification of children’s hierarchies as identity-based means
that children’s development is not a “neutral” process of linear progression
from infancy to adulthood, but rather one that is defined for children by
race, gender, and class.104 Apart from preferred children, challenges and
barriers are created and/or reinforced for other children by both the
presence of state policies and structures, as well as by the absence of support
for every child. The development of those children not preferred by state

99

[O]nly 39.9% of preschool children with disabilities spend 10 hours or more a week in early
childhood programs with their peers without disabilities and receive the majority of their
IDEA services in that location. These data indicate that more than 25 years after the passage
of the American with Disabilities Act, more than 40 years after the passage of IDEA, and
more than 50 years after the passage of Head Start, the majority of young children with
disabilities have yet to experience inclusive early learning opportunities.
Snyder & Conroy, supra note 92, at 63–64.
100 Id. at 65; see also Hyun-Joo Jeon et al., Predicting School Readiness for Low-Income Children with
Disability Risks Identified Early, 77 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 435 (2011).
101 Nittrouer, supra note 4, at 132.
102 On the framing of stories about kids who transcend expectations, see, for example, Tariro
Mzezewa, As Trump Rages About Immigrants, They Go to the Ivy League, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/24/opinion/trump-african-immigrants-ivy-league.html
[https://perma.cc/N5AY-2U8Z] (three sisters born in Cameroon accepted to Ivy League schools).
103 I am comparing here the stigma of formal race segregation as well as de facto continuing
racialized education, the formal legal stigmatizing of nonmarital children and continuing disadvantage
imposed on those children, and the stigma of actual or perceived mental capacity expressed in the
infamous case of Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
104 DOWD, REIMAGINING EQUALITY , supra note 3, at 42–97.
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policy is not, then, a neutral process of evolution through identified stages
related to different capabilities, such as cognitive, emotional, and physical
capabilities.105 Instead, the identities of children matter to the process of their
development. Those identities trigger how others perceive them, their selfperception, and how institutions support or impede their growth. This
creates, under current conditions, a series of challenges or outright hurdles
to achieving and maximizing their developmental capacity.106 At the same
time, other children, with preferred identities, not only are developmentally
supported, but they also learn that their preferred place is part of a natural
hierarchy, so that their perceived success and value are perceived as earned,
rather than a conferred privilege related to preferred identity.107
The works of Margaret Beale Spencer108 and Cynthia Garcia Coll109
place these dynamics of the developmental process in perspective. As
Spencer points out, the process of identity formation and development is
strongly affected by race and gender identities, as well as economic resources
associated with class.110 That affects not only the individual child but the
people and institutions with which they interact, and how the child’s actions
Id.
Id.
107 Id.
108 See Margaret B. Spencer et al., A Theoretical and Empirical Examination of Identity as Coping:
Linking Coping Resources to the Self Processes of African American Youth, 7 APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL
SCI. 181, 182 (2003) [hereinafter Spencer et al., A Theoretical and Empirical Examination of Identity as
Coping]; Margaret Beale Spencer et al., Understanding Hypermasculinity in Context: A Theory-Driven
Analysis of Urban Adolescent Males’ Coping Responses, 1 RES. HUM. DEV . 229, 231 (2004) [hereinafter
Spencer et al., Understanding Hypermasculinity in Context]; see also Margaret Beale Spencer et al.,
African American Adolescents: Adaptational Processes and Socioeconomic Diversity in Behavioural
Outcomes, 11 J. ADOLESCENCE 117, 134 (1988) [hereinafter Spencer et al., African American
Adolescents]; Margaret Beale Spencer & Carol Markstrom-Adams, Identity Processes Among Racial and
Ethnic Minority Children in America, 61 CHILD DEV . 290, 299 (1990).
109 See Cynthia García Coll & Katherine Magnuson, Cultural Differences as Sources of
Developmental Vulnerabilities and Resources, in HANDBOOK OF EARLY CHILDHOOD INTERVENTION 94,
94–111 (Jack P. Shonkoff & Samuel J. Meisels eds., 2d ed. 2000); Cynthia García Coll et al., An
Integrative Model for the Study of Developmental Competencies in Minority Children, 67 CHILD DEV.
1891, 1895–97 (1996) [hereinafter Coll et al., An Integrative Model for the Study of Developmental
Competencies in Minority Children]; Cynthia T. García Coll, Review, Developmental Outcome of
Minority Infants: A Process-Oriented Look into Our Beginnings, 61 CHILD DEV. 270, 271–73 (1990);
Cynthia García Coll & Laura A. Szalacha, The Multiple Contexts of Middle Childhood, 14 FUTURE
CHILD. 81, 82 (2004).
110 Spencer et al., A Theoretical and Empirical Examination of Identity as Coping, supra note 108, at
182.
105
106
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and reactions are perceived. Within this framework, inequality and
stereotyping are normative and challenge the child of color’s very perception
and evolution of self throughout childhood (and into adulthood).111
Moreover, actions by the child are perceived through this lens, so that one of
the ironies of development for children of color is that strong self-identity
can be a risk, as assertion of self can be perceived through the lens of
stereotypes that particularly negatively impact the perception of boys of
color.112
As Garcia Coll points out, the interaction of self, family, and
neighborhood is framed by structures that marginalize and subordinate
children of color, their culture, their neighborhoods, and their families.113 It
requires them to develop, in order to survive and to thrive, skills of “border
crossing” and management of implicit and explicit biases that are not
required of favored/privileged children.114 Garcia Coll focuses on the impact
of culture in the life of the child, as well as its influence in structures, such as
schools, healthcare, and policing. She identifies the interplay of “social
position, racism, and segregation [] that creates the unique conditions and
pathways for children of color.”115 These create experiences and
developmental context not shared with privileged children.116 Notably,
Garcia Coll points out that what are frequently labelled as deficits of children
of color are frequently coping mechanisms and adaptations required by the
demands of, and treatment by, the majority culture.117 They are a strength,
but an asymmetric developmental skill demanded solely of nonwhite
children.
Understanding the developmental dynamic as neither neutral nor
equal, I have advocated for what I have termed “developmental equality.”118
This concept combines our developmental knowledge with the principle of
equality to meaningfully ensure that every child is supported to reach their

111
112
113
114
115

Spencer et al., African American Adolescents, supra note 108, at 134.
Spencer et al., Understanding Hypermasculinity in Context, supra note 108, at 236.
Coll & Szalacha, The Multiple Contexts of Middle Childhood, supra note 109.
Id.
Id. at 81.

Id.
Coll et al., An Integrative Model for the Study of Developmental Competencies in Minority
Children, supra note 109, at 1895–97.
118 DOWD, REIMAGINING EQUALITY , supra note 3, at 66–79.
116
117
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full developmental capacity.119 Critical to developmental equality is a clear
understanding of the existing context of inequalities and hierarchies that
creates different pathways for different children based on identities. In order
to achieve developmental equality, those identity-based differentiations
must be eliminated, in order for every child to have a fair and equal chance.
In addition to dismantling challenges and barriers, developmental equality
would require positive support essential for every child to achieve their
developmental capacity. In light of the critical role of families to children’s
development, positive support would particularly, but not exclusively, focus
on affirmative support of all families.120
Developmental equality infuses the concept of equality with
developmental knowledge about children’s needs in order for them to grow
to their maximum capacity. It also captures the unequal pathway to
developmental capacity currently strongly affected by race, gender, and class
identities. With this developmental insight and goal in mind, it is important
that “equality” be understood and defined in a way that guarantees fairness
to every child. The presence of hierarchies among children does not demand
accommodations or affirmative action in the sense in which that term has
been commonly used.121 Rather, it requires dismantling of the structures and
policies that subordinate, and the construction of affirmative supports so
that every child realizes their potential.122 It demands the elimination of
differentiated developmental pathways based on identity that handicap and
make more difficult some children’s process of growth. To achieve this
equality, we must have a full, robust definition of what children’s equality
requires.

Id.
Id.
121 I distinguish structural change from the underlying assumption of much accommodation and
affirmative action that leaves core norms and structures in place.
122 This is what I have called a “New Deal” for children. D OWD , REIMAGINING EQUALITY, supra
note 3, at 136–57.
119
120
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II. EQUALITY: EQUALITY, EQUITY, DIGNITY
Equality, particularly children’s equality, is composed of three
separable but intertwined concepts: equality, equity, and dignity.123 I use
“equality” in this definition in two ways. First, it is an umbrella term or
shorthand for the core constitutional principle of equal protection.124 That
principle is subject to interpretation and definition informed by the
conceptualization of equality. Second, I also use “equality” to signify the
current interpretation of that term. “Equality” as currently interpreted, as
“sameness,” is not a sufficient definition of the core constitutional principle.
I argue not only that “sameness” must be redefined from its current
constrained understanding, but also that the concepts of equity and dignity
are equally critical concepts to a full, meaningful, substantive definition of
equality. Each concept has its grounding in a concept of equal humanity that
is at the core of our modern concept of equality.
In this Part, I separately explore each of these concepts. While these
concepts are critical to judicial interpretation, they are just as importantly,
and perhaps more importantly, the basis for the exercise of legislative power
to fulfill the state’s affirmative responsibility to assure and support
equality.125
My overarching claim is that equality must be defined as including
equality, equity, and dignity as integral components. Equality is a
substantive concept, with substantive meaning. That meaning has changed
over time. True equality in the sense of race and gender inclusion into “we
the people” requires the capability to exercise equal humanity and
citizenship, not simply the formal recognition that an individual is a citizen.
For children, equality requires providing the support capable of sustaining
their equality at birth: their equal right to achieve to their full developmental
capacity. Because children are not born in identical circumstances, and
because the equality of adults has not been achieved, it is critical that
inequality not be reinscribed on children. Thus, their claims to equality are
unique and strong.

123 An initial conceptual exploration of this tripartite concept of equality was the subject of Dowd,
Equality, Equity, and Dignity, supra note 24.
124 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
125 On the distinction between judicial and legislative power, see Liu, Education, Equality, and
National Citizenship, supra note 30.
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Equality

Equality as interpreted under current equal protection jurisprudence
confounds substantive equality in several ways: through the doctrine of state
action, the requirement of discriminatory intent, the definition of intent as
requiring a very high showing to demonstrate discriminatory intent, and the
rejection of disparate impact theory.126 Even when the elements of state
action are present, as well as firm evidence of discriminatory intent, our idea
of what equality requires is quite limited to identical treatment or
“sameness,” and the absence of differential treatment, or
“antidiscrimination.”127 We lack a concept of equality as affirmative state
responsibility tied to outcomes or to rectify patterns of inequality.
Reva Siegel and Darren Hutchinson have critiqued the limited
interpretation of equality, including the substance, direction, and
consequences of equal protection analysis.128 Even radical change can be

126 On state action, see Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). On discriminatory intent and the
rejection of disparate impact for constitutional claims, see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
On the elevated standard for showing discriminatory intent, see Personnel Administrator of
Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
127 In Brown, the Court rejects the separation part of “separate but equal,” but not the concept of
equal as sameness. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492–93 (1954). This position is reaffirmed in
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Regents of University of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289–90 (1978).

It is settled beyond question that the rights created by the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The rights established are
personal rights. The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to
one individual and something else when applied to a person of another color.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289–90 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (women’s right to attend military academy with program of instruction
that might not be attractive to many women, but the right is for individual access to the same
opportunity). Antidiscrimination, meaning prohibiting intentional discrimination, has resulted in
extreme limits on the use of positive action, despite the extensive remedies authorized in the school
cases. See, e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
128 Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing
State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1997); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on Grounds
Other than Race”: The Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003
U. ILL. L. REV. 615 [hereinafter Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on Grounds Other than Race”].
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domesticated, Siegel cautions, or achieve little actual equality.129 Hutchinson
would argue further that existing doctrine protects and favors the privileged
rather than the oppressed.130 This analysis applied to children would mean
existing doctrine is intended to benefit the privileged by protecting and
reproducing privilege for the children of the elites. In addition, defining
“discrimination” as intentional conduct rather than as patterns of inequality
radically limits the scope of constitutionally protected equality.
Equality has been interpreted as meaning everyone is entitled to the
“same.” It is important to identify what “sameness” means. If we define
equality as the “same” inputs of dollars or goods or resources, at a minimum
or adequate level, and as requiring no affirmative action by the state, then we
are leaving children where we find them.131 Children’s needs and the
differences in their contexts in which they are born demand a very different
definition of equality. Keeping in mind the children at the bottom of
children’s hierarchies, as well as these critiques of current equal protection
concepts of equality, what strategies might be devised to construct a more
robust definition of equality for children?
First, we might reinvigorate or redefine “equality” from within, by
changing how we think about “sameness.”132 We might take the notion of
“sameness,” the state’s affirmative obligation to treat every person the same,
as meaning, for children, sameness of opportunities and therefore providing
the support for each to achieve the “same” maximum developmental

129 Siegel underscores discriminatory purpose as the doctrine that sustains racial hierarchy, by not
seeing hierarchical patterns as violating equal protection. I agree, and further, suspect that with respect
to children, the likely justification for children’s hierarchies that would be articulated is parents. In other
words, if hierarchies exist among children, it is due to decisions made by parents. The lack of discomfort
with hierarchies among children also might be tied to seeing “our” children differently than “other”
children. Finally, the support of family privacy and resistance to a model of state support may also, in
part, be based on fear of state intervention. Siegel, supra note 128.
130 Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on Grounds Other than Race,” supra note 128. He argues equal
protection should instead revolve around an anti-subordination principle.
131 A minimum level reflects this kind of notion of equality; that social and economic rights mean
bare economic survival and social presence. See, e.g., Katharine G. Young, The Minimum Core of
Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in Search of Content, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 113 (2008); see also Frank
I. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls’ Theory of Justice, 121 U.
PA. L. REV. 962 (1973); Charles L. Black, Jr., Further Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of
Livelihood, 86 COLUM. L. REV . 1103 (1986); Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution:
Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1987).
132 DOWD, REIMAGINING EQUALITY , supra note 3, at 115–35.
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capacity.133 Sameness defined in this way would require that the state remove
obstacles in children’s way that mean they do not have the same unfettered
developmental path.134 It would also require calibration of support to
achieve the “same” opportunities even in the absence of removed obstacles
or challenges. Similarly, we might reframe the notion of discrimination as
requiring a showing of discriminatory intent consistent with what we know
about the process of discrimination, cognition, and implicit bias.135
A second strategy would open a new front of analysis as a basis for the
redefinition of “equality” consistent with the broad constitutional principle.
Specifically, this would argue for children’s robust equality rights grounded
on the preparation of children for equal social citizenship.136 Born equal,
equally supported developmentally, children would arrive at the threshold
of adulthood as equal social citizens.137 The social citizenship argument has
133 Dowd, Equality, Equity, and Dignity, supra note 24. This is somewhat similar to, but not the same
as, the “capabilities approach” of Martha Nussbaum. Capabilities are linked to the freedom to achieve
well-being, and Nussbaum has specified the importance of thresholds to a list of capabilities all nations
should guarantee to their citizens, which she links to the concept of dignity. The notion of capabilities
seems very adult centered, but most significantly for my argument here, my advocacy of support to
achieve the maximum developmental capacity of every child is distinctive from the idea of thresholds
that either reflect a minimum or adequate standard, rather than all that an individual child is capable
of. See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY , SPECIES
MEMBERSHIP (2006); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
APPROACH (2011). Applying the capabilities approach to children, Nussbaum and Rosalind Dix argue
that the approach justifies special priority to children among rights holders based on the factors of
vulnerability (due to dependency) of children and a cost effectiveness principle, but they also note the
capabilities approach does not strongly support a claim of distinct welfare or socio-economic rights, as
I argue in this Article. Rosalind Dixon & Martha C. Nussbaum, Children’s Rights and a Capabilities
Approach: The Question of Special Priority, 97 C ORNELL L. REV . 549, 552–54 (2012).
134 Dixon & Nussbaum, supra note 133.
135 For implicit bias literature, see L. Elizabeth Sarine, Regulating the Social Pollution of Systemic
Discrimination Caused by Implicit Bias, 100 CALIF. L. REV . 1359 (2012); Amelia M. Wirts,
Discriminatory Intent and Implicit Bias: Title VII Liability for Unwitting Discrimination, 58 B.C. L. REV .
809 (2017).
136 The work that is most important to identify the social citizenship argument includes that of
Kenneth Karst, Frank Michelman, and most importantly, William Forbath and Joseph Fishkin.
Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV . 1 (1977); Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy
Constitution, 94 B.U. L. REV. 669 (2014) [hereinafter Fishkin & Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy
Constitution]; Michelman, supra note 131.
137 See, e.g., William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1999)
[hereinafter Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship]; Fishkin & Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy
Constitution, supra note 136; Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, supra note 30.
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strong appeal for legislative change as well as changing judicial
interpretation.138
The concept of social citizenship is a theory of positive rights grounded
in Reconstruction and the New Deal.139 While the theorizing of social
citizenship has focused on adults and economic rights, an even stronger
argument can be made for children. Children’s positive rights are broader
than economic rights and require support of maximum developmental
capacity. So, distinct from the arguments of most prior scholars, I argue that
with respect to children, the role of the state to provide developmental
support for children is an obligation to maximize their capabilities, not to
provide a bare minimum or a low level of adequacy.
Kenneth Karst has argued that dignity is central to equal citizenship:
the core substantive principle of the Fourteenth Amendment is equal
citizenship: “The substantive core of the amendment, and of the equal
protection clause in particular, is a principle of equal citizenship, which
presumptively guarantees to each individual the right to be treated by the
organized society as respected, responsible, and participating member.”140
Citizenship “embodies an ethic of mutual respect and self-esteem” and
includes “participation and responsibility.”141
For Karst, this is not a claim on the state or society for equalization or
dismantling of economic hierarchies. “[T]he principle of equal citizenship is
not a charter for sweeping economic leveling.”142 He nevertheless
acknowledges minimum welfare is essential to equal citizenship “when
economic inequalities make it impossible for a person to have a ‘fully human
existence’ and the political branches of government turn a blind eye.”143
Karst’s conception is adult-centered. Children are not within his focus
and so he does not consider how preparation for equal citizenship might
have different parameters. The importance of his argument for reframing
equality around social citizenship is conceptual: that the overarching aim of
the Fourteenth Amendment was to confer rights equal to those of white
138 The affirmative role of Congress to accomplish social citizenship accords with the scholarship of
Goodwin Liu. Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, supra note 30.
139 Id.; Fishkin & Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, supra note 136.
140 Karst, supra note 136, at 4.

Id. at 6, 8 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 11. He sees the chief obstacle to equality by race and gender as “psychological,” which can
be cured by access to voting and ending discrimination. Id. at 26.
143 Id. at 62 (internal footnote omitted).
141
142
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men, who were the only model for “citizen” in the original Constitution. The
perspective of privilege establishes a robust, complex norm of full and equal
citizenship.
William Forbath builds upon the idea of social citizenship by
expanding the foundation for the principle to the constitutional
transformation wrought by the New Deal.144 Forbath unearths this “lost”
New Deal constitutional tradition, adding a framing of the meaning of
equality beyond race, slavery, and the status of all African Americans as
unequal. He argues the New Deal tradition is class-based, focused on what
is economically essential for each person to be a citizen who participates in
society and the polity. “Aimed against harsh class inequalities, [the New
Deal] centered on decent work and livelihoods, social provision, and a
measure of economic independence and democracy.”145 The New Deal
principles incorporate ideas of economic justice: what is key is work and
economic opportunity, and this is what links class and caste.146
At the same time, Forbath critically evaluates the New Deal,
particularly its utter failure to deal with the short-lived Reconstruction effort
to establish meaningful equality for Blacks. The New Deal reinforced racial
subordination while providing incomplete class equality.147 His critical look
at how the New Deal plays out, particularly its reinforcement of the
incomplete Reconstruction project of racial equality, and the retrenchment
of racial hierarchy, makes social citizenship an admittedly imperfect and
deeply flawed tradition. “The tangled knot of race and class lies unexamined
at the heart of this history.”148 Class equality and race equality are
intertwined because of this incomplete and unrealized agenda.149
Social citizenship shorn of its subordinating implementation
nevertheless is a powerful definition of substantive equality. Together with
Joseph Fishkin, Forbath has argued for an “anti-oligarchy Constitution”
reinforcing the full social citizenship concept, looking to the New Deal as an
144

Forbath, Caste, Class and Equal Citizenship, supra note 137.

Id. at 1.
Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 7. “The constitutional bad faith that for half a century enabled both parties and all three
branches of the federal government to condone or support Jim Crow and disenfranchisement,
produced the anomaly of a reactionary core at the heart of FDR’s New Deal liberal coalition. This
excluded most of black America from the benefits of the main New Deal programs.” Id. at 85.
149 Id.
145
146
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essential constitutional “moment” that changes the focus and meaning of
equal protection and “equality,” but arguing for its meaning to include the
lost goals of Reconstruction.150 Fishkin and Forbath identify Roosevelt’s
arguments for the New Deal based on several constitutional provisions: the
general welfare clause, equal protection, and “first principles,” to provide the
foundation for policies focused on work, education, housing, healthcare,
and social insurance.151 Their contemporary argument is that
concentrations of wealth/economic inequality harm democracy, and so
become a constitutional problem.152 Translating this argument to children,
some scholars similarly have identified economic inequality as undermining
stability and basic support for children, suggesting policy proposals to help
poor families.153 If families are critical to democracy, then this is a similar
argument about inequalities of wealth as foundationally destructive.
One scholar who has applied the idea of social citizenship to children
is Goodwin Liu,154 by drawing on the social citizenship concept to make his
case for equal education based upon the Fourteenth Amendment “citizen”
clause rather than the Equal Protection Clause.155
At its core, the tradition holds that there is a “basic human equality
associated with the concept of full membership of a community”
and that it is the duty of government to ensure the civil and
political as well as social and economic prerequisites for the
realization of this equality.156
This is a claim of positive rights essential to liberty.157 Education is
essential to citizenship. Therefore, the state has an affirmative obligation to
ensure that each person has equal citizenship. This positive rights argument

150
151

Fishkin & Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, supra note 136.
Id. at 689.

152 Id. at 690; see also Rosalind Dixon & Julie Suk, Liberal Constitutionalism and Economic
Inequality, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 369 (2018).
153 Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Growing Inequality and Children, 23 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC.
POL’Y & L. 283 (2015).
154 Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, supra note 30; see also Goodwin Liu,
Interstate Inequality in Educational Opportunity, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2044 (2006) [hereinafter Liu,
Interstate Inequality].
155 Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, supra note 30, at 336–45.
156
157

Id. at 336.
Id.
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is especially powerful for education. It assures a floor of opportunity, and
therefore equity among citizens. Liu argues that the Fourteenth Amendment
authorizes and “obligates Congress to ensure a meaningful floor of
educational opportunity throughout the nation.”158 The Amendment is an
affirmative grant of national citizenship. Therefore, he argues social and
economic rights are an obligation of Congress.159
The right claimed by Liu is firmly claimed as children’s right. He argues
for the obligation to legislate a substantive minimum of education equity as
a national standard.160 That national standard is essential, he claims, because
differences between the quality of schools and the quality of education
within school districts, between districts, or any other variation that is
intrastate are far less (although significant) than the differences between
states.161 Liu’s powerful argument can and should be expanded beyond
resource allocations to other needs and means to assure the educational
system provides equal developmental support to all. I might argue that more
than a national minimum is needed, but such a standard would be a
substantial step toward an educational system designed to achieve
developmental equality. Other systems that are also critical to children’s
development as equal social citizens must serve all children equally with this
goal in mind. Inherent in an analysis of funding alone can be an assumption
of equality focused on sameness of resources or inputs into children’s
education. But if equality is focused on opportunities and outcomes, then it
can have two consequences. First, in order to assure equality of opportunity,
the factors that get in the way of maximizing each child’s development must
be a focus, even an obligation, for removal. Second, ensuring the same
developmental opportunities and outcomes can mean differentiation in
support to achieve that equality goal.
Equality for children requires, for each child, guaranteeing their
development to their full capacity, for their individual benefit as well as
society’s and the polity’s benefit. Social citizenship is a rich definition of
substantive equality. Children’s equality means the assurance of the means
Id. at 334.
Id. at 340 (“Thus the legislated Constitution, in contrast to the adjudicated Constitution, is not
‘narrowly legal’ but rather dynamic, aspirational, and infused with ‘national values and
commitments.’”).
160 Id. (“I infer a distributive principle for educational opportunity that I call educational adequacy
for equal citizenship.”). His analysis rests in part on the actions during Reconstruction to establish
public education as a basis for equal citizenship.
161 Liu, Interstate Inequality, supra note 154.
158
159
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to be equal as children, in order to become citizens with equal opportunity
to succeed and contribute to society. Inherent in that understanding of
equality, and of the concept of preparation and support based on the
inherent value of children as well as their future equal citizenship, are equity
and dignity. I turn to those co-equal threads intertwined with, and in,
equality.
B.

Equity

An infusion and reorientation of current equal protection analysis
would create a deep substantive understanding of equality. Inherent in that
redefinition of equality, but not current doctrine, are the principles of equity
and dignity. Another way to argue for an expanded concept of the
constitutional equality principle is to claim that equity and dignity are
integral to equality.
At its core, equity means “fairness,” taking into account where
someone stands and what they need to get to the end goal of equal
opportunity or preparation for maximized social citizenship. Equity, by
paying attention to differences, requires taking stock of what creates
differences and generates hierarchy. If inequity exists, we must ask whether
this is structural and state-caused or whether it simply reflects inherent
differences among individuals.162 Attentiveness to inherent differences
ensures fairness by providing the means to achieve the support and
capability to maximize children’s development. At the same time,
identification of structural barriers or discrimination that may be the source
of identified differences or that cause differences to be perceived as “natural”
when in fact they are created, requires working around immediate structural
issues but devising long-term structural solutions, not simply
accommodating and perpetuating structural problems.

162 See, e.g., KIRWAN INST., OHIO STATE UNIV., FAIR H OUSING AND E QUITY ASSESSMENT:
DEVELOPING A SCOPE OF WORK TO MAXIMIZE EQUITABLE OUTCOMES (2012),
http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/my-product/fair-housing-and-equity-assessment-fhea-guide-series
[https://perma.cc/J7KG-WCWD]; REECE ET AL., supra note 63 (taking into account the composite
indicators that impact child development, which may link to structural factors and essential policy to
reverse this constitutional violation of children’s rights).
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John Rawls identifies fairness with justice.163 Fairness, according to
Rawls, is grounded in equal opportunity. Differences must not be linked to
lack of equal opportunity.164 He accepts hierarchy as part of society but only
if there is sufficient benefit or support for the least advantaged.165 For equal
opportunity to be meaningful, then, the means to reach full developmental
capacity must be assured not solely by assured opportunity but also by
assured support of developmental capacity.
Equity translates to fairness connected to needs. It inherently includes
positive action and support in order to achieve the substantive goal of
developmental equality, but also differentiation as needed for each child to
achieve that end. In contrast to current definitions of equality as “sameness,”
interpreted as “same treatment,” or “same benefits,” it does not limit
children to a universal benefit but instead ensures fair outcomes.
Our treatment of children with disabilities is often identified as a
paradigm of equity. In its current form, disability accommodation doctrine
is helpful but partial. However, its limitations may be a guide for what equity
should mean.166 In its most robust form, recognition of disabilities triggers
accommodation that permits the individual to accomplish the goal or access
the opportunity. For some children, their disability may limit their
developmental capacity, but it should not limit their ability to maximize
their developmental potential. The disability paradigm also must be
critically used. For example, the legal requirement of accommodation can be
criticized as inadequate, and the assurance of support to achieve maximum
development is not always well coordinated or sufficient.167 In addition, the
JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: POLITICAL, NOT METAPHYSICAL 11–17 (1985).
Id. at 13.
165 Id. at 15.
166 For contradictions and critiques, see generally Elizabeth R. Schiltz, Hauerwas and Disability Law:
Exposing the Cracks in the Foundations of Disability Law, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23 (2012);
Allison Zimmer, Solving the IDEA Puzzle: Building a Better Special Education Development Process
Through Endrew F., 93 N.Y.U. L. REV . 1014 (2018) (critiquing IDEA and the potential for change under
Endrew). See also the policy issue of students placed in alternative schools, at the intersection of race
and disability, Barbara Fedders, Schooling at Risk, 103 IOWA L. REV . 871 (2018), as well as the links
between disability and the school-to-prison pipeline, Shameka Stanford & Bahiyyah Muhammad, The
Confluence of Language and Learning Disorders and the School-to-Prison Pipeline Among Minority
Students of Color: A Critical Race Theory, 26 AM. U. J. GENDER, & SOC. POL’Y & L. 691 (2018).
167 On the inadequacy of the legal requirement of accommodation, see, for example, Talha Syed,
Educational Accommodation and Distributive Equity: The Principle of Proportionate Progress, 50 CONN.
L. REV . 485 (2018).
163
164
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disability paradigm reveals a norm that may reinforce the perception of the
disabled child or adult as “other.”168 While to some extent disability advocacy
has required the norm to adjust (architectural and planning requirements,
for example), separation and segregation still persist.169
Equity does not have a single meaning, and in an environment of scarce
resources, the most robust form of equity may not be possible.170 But with
respect to American children, scarcity is not an excuse.171 Fairness or equity
should include the support necessary to maximize developmental capacity.
In the process of assuring that support, identification of structural issues that
generate differences that require differential support should lead to
dismantling the structural impediments as well.
Children and education is an especially rich context in which to think
about equity. Lauren Webb identifies a range of equity possibilities with
respect to intradistrict funding disparities for education.172 Most promising
among her possibilities are vertical equity and comprehensive equity.
168 LaToya Baldwin Clark, Beyond Bias: Cultural Capital in Anti-Discrimination Law, 53 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 381 (2018) (bias in special education law in application); Anne Proffitt Dupre,
Disability and the Public Schools: The Case Against “Inclusion,” 72 WASH . L. REV . 775 (1997) (treating
the child as “other” by separating the child versus inclusion or mainstreaming to restructure the
community of learning, critique of inclusion concept as applied).
169 Snyder & Conroy, supra note 92; Rud Turnbull, Education, Ethical Communities, and Personal
Dignity, 55 INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 110, 110–11 (2017) [hereinafter Turnbull,
Education, Ethical Communities, and Personal Dignity]; Rud Turnbull, Disability Law and Policy: Core
Concepts and the Ethical Principles of Family, Dignity, and Community, in CELEBRATING 50 YEARS OF
CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES (Barbara Hanna Wasik
& Samuel L. Odom eds., 2019).
170 Alicia Ely Yamin, Suffering and Powerlessness: The Significance of Promoting Participation in
Rights-Based Approaches to Health, 11 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 5, 14–15 (2009). The CRC makes state
obligations contingent on the ability of the particular country to provide resources within its total
budget and resources. Id.
171 In fiscal year 2019, the estimated federal budget is $4.407 trillion. Discretionary spending is
$1.305 trillion; over half that amount is spent on the military. Kimberly Amadeo, U.S. Federal Budget
Breakdown: The Budget Components and Impact on the U.S. Economy, BALANCE ,
https://www.thebalance.com/u-s-federal-budget-breakdown-3305789
[https://perma.cc/BYK5YPYD] (last updated Feb. 13, 2020). “In 2017, 9 percent of the federal budget (or $375 billion of $3.9
trillion) was spent on children younger than 19. An additional $106 billion in tax reductions was
targeted to families with children. Combining budget outlays and tax reductions, federal expenditures
on children totaled $481 billion.” JULIA B. ISAACS ET AL., URBAN INST., KIDS’ SHARE 2018: REPORT ON
FEDERAL EXPENDITURES ON CHILDREN THROUGH 2017 AND FUTURE PROJECTIONS (2018),
https://www.urban.org/research/publication/kids-share-2018-report-federal-expenditures-childrenthrough-2017-and-future-projections [https://perma.cc/22Y6-6J2R].
172 Webb, supra note 67.
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Vertical equity means equity of opportunity, funding variations among
students depending on their disadvantages, with the goal of providing access
to resources needed to learn and thrive.173 Vertical equity, by being attentive
to disadvantages, should also examine the sources of disadvantages in order
to not replicate or reify them. Some include in vertical equity an adequacy
framework, that is, that achieving vertical equity would mean reaching a
level of sufficiency.174 This begs the question of what “sufficiency” means.
Comprehensive equity solves this problem, combining adequacy and
vertical equity, with adequacy defined at the high end, as the preparation or
support needed to pursue a college education or a career after high school.175
This incorporates a measure that links to meaningful economic
opportunity.176
The connection between inequity and structural, constructed harms
bears reinforcement. A particularly powerful example of this is toxic water,
which creates lifelong harms to children who are born in families who are
affected by this silent but monstrously harmful source of developmental
harm. Emily Benfer, in a comprehensive analysis, identifies toxic water as a
government-created harm perpetuated by government failure to address the
problem once identified.177 Toxic water has its highest impact on children in
poverty, and thus the impact is disproportionate by race.178 These
government failures are based on the framework of federal lead poisoning
prevention laws.179 If equity is defined only as providing the supports needed
Id.
Id.
175 Id.
176 Health equities analysis similarly differentiates between ideas of equity. One scholar calls one
approach the solidarity approach, focusing on society as a whole and providing all with a guarantee of
the same access to healthcare, ignoring the needs of groups or individuals, similar to the horizontal
equity approach in the education setting. MAMDOUH GABR, HEALTH ETHICS, EQUITY AND HUMAN
DIGNITY, http://www.humiliationstudies.org/documents/GabrHealthEthics.pdf [https://perma.cc/
HR7Z-R5LA]. Alternatively, the individual right approach is based on each individual’s access to
healthcare and equal outcomes. Gabr notes this is only possible in wealthy communities and/or
countries. Because of the feasibility of this approach in the United States, this limitation is not relevant
although the claim that it is undoubtedly will be made.
177 Toxic water, such as the example of Flint, now emerging in other communities, is an example of
government created harm and its disproportionate burden on the poor. Emily A. Benfer, Contaminated
Childhood: How the United States Failed to Prevent the Chronic Lead Poisoning of Low-Income Children
and Communities of Color, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 493 (2017).
178 Id.
179 Id.
173
174
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for the children affected by lead poisoning, then the inadequacy of the laws,
and the perpetuation of the harm, continue. If, on the other hand, the
identification of the source of developmental difference leads to this
identification of state policy or the lack of it, then equity demands going to
the root of the problem and solving it.180
Many structural obstructions in health and education that create
differences among children are tied to the high rate of child poverty and
widening income inequality.181 Olatunde Johnson argues for strategic
approaches using available tools at multiple levels to expand the concept of
equality.182 She, like many others, calls for inclusion to be neighborhoodfocused.183 She contends that the concept of economic inequality must
expand to include race and gender.184 Inattention to those factors by the
“neutral” category of economic inequality ignores the race- and genderspecific nature of the barriers to equality and the differences that require
attention under the demands of equity.185
The focus of equity also may depend on the scope of the understanding
of what supports or resources are relevant to maximizing developmental
capacity. In the healthcare setting, for example, this is reflected in the
concept of the social determinants of health.186 Equity in healthcare for
children is not solely about providing all the care (preventive or responsive
to illness or injury) that they need, but also investigating why they have the
healthcare needs that they have. A child that keeps returning to an asthma

180 Equity for children also demands that adults not create the harms that affect children’s future.
This is the theory of the climate change lawsuit brought by kids on behalf of themselves as a future
generation harmed by the current actions of adults.
181 Leslie J. Harris, Family Policy After the Fragile Families and Relationship Dynamics Studies, 35 L.
& INEQ. 223 (2017) (outlining essential policies for where we are versus where we should be).
182 Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Equality Law Pluralism, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1973 (2017).
183 See also Raj Chetty et al., Where Is the Land of Opportunity? The Geography of Intergenerational
Mobility in the United States, 129 Q.J. ECON. 1553 (2014); Raj Chetty et al., The Effects of Exposure to
Better Neighborhoods on Children: New Evidence from the Moving to Opportunity Experiment, 106 A M.
ECON. REV. 855 (2016); Jaime Alison Lee, Poverty, Dignity, and Public Housing, 47 C OLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV . 97 (2015). Regarding strategies, see also Tahk, supra note 87 (direct benefits or support may be
politically untenable, but tax strategies such as credits could be expanded).
184 Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Inclusion, Exclusion, and the “New” Economic Inequality, 94 TEX. L. REV .
1647 (2016).
185 On paying attention to gender, and specifically to fathers, see Hatcher, supra note 88, at 239.
186 Rachel Rebouché & Scott Burris, The Social Determinants of Health, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF U.S. HEALTH LAW 1097 (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds., 2017).
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clinic may be suffering due to inadequate or toxic housing.187 Learning
difficulties may relate to stresses on families and communities that weaken
or render inadequate the social supports essential to maximizing
educational benefits and opportunities.188 Alternatively, it may simply be
because families, especially very young parents, are lacking in support.189
Equity is essential to equality, to ensure equal outcomes and
opportunities, not the replication of hierarchy. Equity’s attentiveness to
needs and differences is linked to respect for every child’s dignity.
C.

Dignity

Dignity underscores an important, central human rights norm integral
to the constitutional definition of equality.190 Like equity, dignity gives
substance to equality in ways that our current simplistic and limited
definitional notions of equality alone may not, especially equality limited to

187 Siegel et al., supra note 36. Forthcoming work by Angela Harris and Aysha Pamukcu argues the
social determinants of health should generate a new civil rights strategy linking health inequities to
subordination, reinvigorating civil rights in this critical structural area. Angela P. Harris & Aysha
Pamukcu, The Civil Rights of Health: A New Approach to Challenging Structural Inequality, UCLA L.
REV. (forthcoming 2020).
188 CHRISTOPHER BLODGETT, WASH . S TATE OFFICE OF FIN. MGMT., NO SCHOOL ALONE : HOW
COMMUNITY RISKS AND ASSETS CONTRIBUTE TO SCHOOL AND YOUTH SUCCESS 1, 3 (2015),
https://traumasensitiveschools.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/no_school_alone-WashingtonState.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KLV-R8JL]. This project compiled data on school demographics, teacher
qualifications, census data on socio-economic status, risk profiles of the Washington State Department
of Social and Health Services, and measures of adult well-being from the Behavioral Risk Factor
Surveillance System, with the goal of assessing not just student profiles but community resources,
strengths, and weaknesses that impact the ability to serve student needs. Id.
189 See supra text accompanying note 27.
190 Dignity, along with equality and equity, is contained in the primary human rights document for
children, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1990. G.A. Res. 44/25, Convention on the
Rights of the Child (Nov. 20, 1989) (“Considering that the child should be fully prepared to live an
individual life in society, and brought up in the spirit of the ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the
United Nations, and in particular in the spirit of peace, dignity, tolerance, freedom, equality and
solidarity . . . .”). It is the core principle announced in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “All
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and
conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” G.A. Res. 217 (III) A,
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). For an example of analysis of the human rights
concept of dignity, see Alicia Ely Yamin, Shades of Dignity: Exploring the Demands of Equality in
Applying Human Rights Frameworks to Health, 11 HEALTH & HUM. RTS 1 (2009).
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“sameness” or “colorblindness.”191 Equity equals fairness, linked to
children’s needs to maximize development. Equity, however, arguably does
not set a level of equity at which it is achieved, as in a maximum or minimum
or somewhere in between.192 Dignity, however, may provide a measure:
dignity requires respect for the individual and recognizes their inherent
humanity and equal worth.193 So the right to dignity triggers collective
responsibility for the equal development of each child, but also establishes
the level of responsibility as the support necessary to achieve each child’s
maximum capacity. So defined, that responsibility leads to dismantling
barriers and inequalities, in order to support the dignity of each child.194
Each child’s dignity is both as a child, and triggered by their own evolution
to become an adult who equally participates, contributes, and is respected.
Dignity enhances the depth of equality; strengthens the claim of necessary
socio-economic rights and developmental rights; and substantively requires
a full, maximum development approach that at the same time is highly
individualized in order to be recognized for each child. Dignity empowers
every child to be equal. It is about concrete opportunities and measurable
outcomes, but it is also, as dignity underscores, about true respect.195
One scholar identifies three meanings or elements of dignity: first, an
inherent/ontological element; second, how one is treated by others; and
third, as public responsibility or state obligation, the idea that “states have a
positive obligation to progressively realise human dignity through the
mechanism of socio-economic rights.”196 Dignity is rooted in Kantian ethics:
the categorical imperative that “everyone’s inherent human dignity has to be

Supra Section II.A (discussion of equality).
Supra Section II.B (discussion of equity).
193 The Constitutional Court of South Africa has been a leader in interpretation of dignity as
requiring substantive socio-economic rights for dignity to have concrete meaning. See THE DIGNITY
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA: CASES AND MATERIALS (Drucilla
Cornell et al. eds., 2013). On children’s socio-economic rights under human rights and constitutional
analysis, see also NOLAN, CHILDREN’S SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS, supra note 30.
194 Professor Ton Liefaard, a leading international children’s rights expert, articulates this individual
claim of dignity as the idea of “equality plus” where the plus is “equivalence.” Dowd, Equality, Equity,
and Dignity, supra note 24.
195 On dignity as empowerment to be equal, requiring meaningful respect, see id. at 13; Rinie
Steinmann, The Core Meaning of Human Dignity, 19 POTCHEFSTROOM ELECTRONIC L.J. 1, 5 (2016).
196 Steinmann, supra note 195, at 1.
191
192
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respected and protected universally.”197 As conceptualized in this three-part
framework, public responsibility is a minimum: it is the state duty to provide
an “existential minimum” of living conditions (housing, healthcare, food,
and water).198 As I use it here, public responsibility for the dignity of
children, particularly the children at the bottom of children’s hierarchies,
requires maximum support. Dignity triggers the right of equal
developmental opportunity and support, to ensure each child’s maximum
developmental capacity.
Rud Turnbull199 defines dignity as “worthiness.” Worthiness includes
or is expressive of the constitutional principles of life, liberty, equality, and
the constitutional goal of happiness.200 His example of this in action is
frequently his son, who had an intellectual disability.201 The goal for his son
was to maximize his developmental capacity, and to do so in a way that made
his life meaningful, a life of dignity, to treat him as worthy. This meant his
parents fighting for his inclusion in mainstream environments and fending
off efforts to marginalize or patronize their child. Sharon Rush has similarly
linked equality and dignity, arguing appreciation and valuing of diverse
identities are part of equality and rests upon every child’s dignity.202 This
aspect of dignity requires cultural competence, appreciation of diversity, and
nonhierarchical interactions among children. Dignity is therefore
connected to cultural equality and mutual value.

197 Id. It is incorporated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, German Basic Law, and
section 10 of the Constitution of South Africa. Id.
198 Id. at 7.
199 Turnbull, Education, Ethical Communities, and Personal Dignity, supra note 169, at 110–11.
Discussions with Rud and Ann Turnbull were instrumental to my thinking about dignity.
200 This includes protection from harm (life); autonomy, privacy, empowerment, participation,
decisionmaking, and physical liberty (liberty); and anti-discrimination, cultural responsiveness,
integration, and productivity (equality). Rud Turnbull, Co-Founder, Beach Ctr. on Disability, Univ. of
Kan., Address at the University of Florida Anita Zucker Center for Excellence in Early Childhood
Studies Symposium (Jan. 26, 2018); see also Interview by Minnesota Governor’s Council on
Developmental Disabilities with Rud Turnbull (2014) [hereinafter Interview with Rud Turnbull]
(interview with Rud Turnbull on these core concepts), https://mn.gov/mnddc/rud-turnbull/rudturnbull-18.html [https://perma.cc/226S-T5WC].
201 See Interview with Rud Turnbull, supra note 200.
202 Rush, Protecting the Dignity and Equality of Children, supra note 71.
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Peggy Davis203 reminds us of the critical link between children’s dignity
and family dignity. Dignity requires empowerment, not simply a more
respectful state.204 Davis nevertheless is concerned with the potentially
negative role of the state. In her view, support of children must include
support for the integrity and dignity of their families.205 Jane Spinak carries
this intersection between children’s dignity and family dignity further,206
emphasizing that children and families are in synergy, not in conflict, with
respect to their dignity needs. Using the concept of social citizenship, she
argues for positive family support because healthy families are critical to a
healthy democracy.207 Inequity “demands exploring every avenue to
diminish that inequity, including revisiting our constitutional interpretation
of basic rights.”208 This perspective is important to underscore: children
cannot be separated from their families (nor families from communities).
Children’s equality rights are inescapably bound up with families’ dignity
rights.
Some constitutional scholars might suggest that dignity could serve as
a better alternative umbrella principle for children rather than equality. In
other words, dignity could serve as a way to transcend the limits of existing
equal protection doctrine and the interpretation of “equality.”209 Kenji
203 Peggy Cooper Davis, Little Citizens and Their Families, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1009, 1012–15
(2016).
204 The difference is captured in one scholar’s comparison of policing reforms, between liberal
arguments for better training versus Black Lives Matter activists’ focus on a different paradigm of
policing. Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV . 405 (2018).
205 Davis, supra note 203, at 1020–21.
206 Jane M. Spinak, Dignity Rights: A Response to Peggy Cooper Davis’s “Little Citizens and Their
Families,” 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1221 (2016). Spinak critiques the inadequacy of existing family
support programs, including their insufficiency, their dignitary harm of recipients, and the exclusion
of the most severely poor from policies like tax credits.
207 Id. at 1228–29. Spinak argues that the substance of dignity can be based on the CRC model of
balancing child, family, and state. As the Supreme Court has already used the CRC to strike the juvenile
death penalty, she argues, why not use it as the basis for entitlement as well?
208 Id. at 1229.
209 Another area of law that has used dignity arguments is criminal justice, as a tool in arguments
regarding race and criminal law, mass incarceration, bias in the juvenile and adult criminal systems,
and severe racial disproportionality. See, e.g., Christopher A. Bracey, Dignity in Race Jurisprudence, 7 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 669, 669 (2005) (“Dignity remains the core aspirational value in the struggle for racial
justice. For Americans of African descent, the relentless demand to be treated with respect and equal
humanity resonates in virtually every sector of intellectual and cultural life.”). Bracey reminds us that
dignitary and stigmatic harm were the hallmarks of the slavery regime. See also Michael Pinard,
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Yoshino names as dignity claims those constitutional arguments that
intertwine equal protection and substantive due process claims, or
equality/liberty claims.210 He explores “dignity” claims as a possible pathway
out of the limitations of equal protection jurisprudence.211 Yoshino sees the
“liberty” door of fundamental rights doctrine as still open, even as “equality”
has narrowed or shut.212 Yoshino’s analysis might suggest that linking
dignity to liberty might be more fruitful for children’s equality, rather than
my linking of dignity to equality. In other words, it might be better to claim
for children a liberty/dignity claim, rather than an equality/dignity claim.
But that coupling runs up against the inability of children to exercise full
autonomy or liberty well into their development toward becoming adults.
Hutchinson suggests a different caution about using the concept of
dignity.213 Under the Court’s existing jurisprudence, he argues, dignity is
undertheorized and ambiguous, has been used to undermine racial justice
and defend the dignity of whites, fails to include all vulnerable groups, and
is tied to judicial ideology that continues to reinforce white privilege.214
Hutchinson’s concerns are well-founded and his critique is essential to keep
in mind. Nevertheless, dignity is an important and powerful thread as part
of equality, rather than as a replacement. It is not separate from it, or a means
around limitations of equality; rather, it is an integral part of equality and
positive rights unique to children.
D.

Equality and Identities

Equality redefined in this way as robust substantive equality cannot be
achieved by thinking about children neutrally, when their current reality
marks them positively (by privileging them) or negatively (by
disadvantaging them), or by identities (such as race, gender, and class).
Because hierarchies among children are not only economic hierarchies, but

Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 457 (2010) (discussing the collateral consequences of crime, both while incarcerated and during
post-incarceration, regarding housing, benefits, work, and voting).
210 Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV . 747 (2011).
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Undignified: The Supreme Court, Racial Justice, and Dignity Claims,
69 F LA. L. REV . 1 (2017).
214 Id.
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are strongly racialized and gendered, a critical component of equity is
“fairness” defined in racial and gender terms, just as a critical component of
dignity is to stand from the perspective of children subordinated by race,
gender, and class. Constructing a robust definition of equality requires
rejecting the notion of the “neutral” child. At the same time, it is important
to comprehend complex identities; to gain the perspective not simply of one
identity, but to recognize the diversity, complexity, and variability of
identities used to subordinate, such as those of Native American, Asian,
Latinx, and immigrant children, along with their multiple intersections of
race with gender, class, and other critical identities.
The work of Robin Lenhardt215 and Khiara Bridges216 reminds us of the
ways in which race, gender, and class work with respect to children and
families. They make visible the complex demands of equality and equity, as
well as the importance of dignity. The subordination of families of color has
meant the strained and limited definition of equality has failed to support
these families historically and currently, carrying forward an
intergenerational replication of inequality. This inequality when viewed
from the perspective of children means that their place in the hierarchy
begins at birth, and even before birth. The most crucial ecology for their
early development is challenged by the maldistribution by race of the high
rate of child poverty, and the known correlations between poverty and
development. In addition, the two most important existing systems that
intersect with their development, health, and education, are riddled with
inequities that not only fail to deal with differences at birth, but frequently
exacerbate and widen those differences.217 Equity, “fairness,” as a
reinforcement of attention to needs, must be consciously attentive to the
lines along which those needs cluster. Equity must not only deal with needs
but must also recognize patterns and should trigger structural reforms to
eliminate inequities rather than solely attend to their effects while leaving
215 Lenhardt, The Color of Kinship, supra note 27; Lenhardt, Race, Dignity, and the Right to Marry,
supra note 27.
216 Bridges discusses the interaction of race and class in the context of families receiving public
assistance and the invasion of privacy that accompanies interactions of indigent women with the state.
Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 113 (2011) [hereinafter
Bridges, Privacy Rights]; Khiara M. Bridges, Towards a Theory of State Visibility: Race, Poverty, and
Equal Protection, 19 C OLUM. J. GENDER & L. 965 (2010) [hereinafter Bridges, Towards a Theory of State
Visibility].
217 See supra text accompanying note 27.
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them in place. Dignity requires recognizing and acting in a way that respects
the humanity of all children. This must include socio-economic support of
families that meaningfully respects their role in the development of children.
Lenhardt has argued that we must be “race attentive” to the role of law
in subordinating families along racial lines.218 Just as gender analysis has
exposed the reinforcement of patriarchy, under both explicit and genderneutral family law norms, so too family law requires critical race analysis to
expose how legal rules racially subordinate. As an example, in her analysis of
the Obergefell v. Hodges opinion,219 Lenhardt challenges whether the
embrace of same sex marriage as critical to “dignity” rang true for Black
families.220 “I am not convinced that access to marital rights, without more,
magically cures the stigma, deprivation, disparate treatment, and harm that
come with outsider status. Indeed, marriage regulation, in some instances,
could very well exacerbate these wrongs.”221 To claim what marriage is and
what it confers without considering the experience and current realities of
Black families, she argues, “whitewashes” reality and reinforces
subordination.222 Dignity, Lenhardt concludes, cannot and should not be
whitewashed;223 nor, I would argue, should equality or equity. Concepts as

218 Lenhardt’s powerful example is the case of Walter Scott, shot in North Charlestown, South
Carolina by a police officer as he ran away because he thought he was being pursued for unpaid child
support. It is a graphic illustration of the interaction of systems of subordination linked to family.
Lenhardt, The Color of Kinship, supra note 27, at 2105; see also Lenhardt, Race, Dignity, and the Right to
Marry, supra note 27; Margaret F. Brinig, Racial and Gender Justice in the Child Welfare and Child
Support Systems, 35 L. & INEQ. 199 (2017) (looking at child welfare from the lens of court records in one
county in Indiana and showing the impact of frequent moves). Lenhardt identifies a set of principles
that should be integral to equality and equity analysis and keeping race in view rather than hidden. Her
list of principles includes a complex understanding of race; family norms and racial formation;
exploring racial identities and intersectionality; exploring whiteness; looking at intersections of gender,
class, sexual orientation, and race in kinship units and roles; structural inequalities; and broad kinship
definitions and understanding, coupled with historical, interdisciplinary, narrative, empirical, and
collaborative research methods. Lenhardt, The Color of Kinship, supra note 27, at 2101–02. One factor,
structural inequality, might include how family policy, structure, and systems impact other areas. Id.
See also Stanford researchers on the impact of “black spaces,” the evolution of stereotypes, and the
impact on policing and housing values. Courtney M. Bonam et al., Polluting Black Space, 145 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1561 (2016).
219 Lenhardt, Race, Dignity, and the Right to Marry, supra note 27.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 53.
222
223

Id.
Id.
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well as outcomes must be measured in real terms. Children’s identities must
be kept in view if equality is to be achieved.224
Bottom line, as Lenhardt argues, race matters. Just as the typical
developmental model is inadequate because it fails to take into account how
race matters for Black children and other children at the bottom of the
hierarchy, so too how we construct concepts will be inadequate if race, in
addition to gender and class, is not kept firmly in view.
Khiara Bridges would argue that identities are critical to inequities that
originate even prior to birth, based on state action that ignores “privacy”
while subordinating mothers under the guise of assistance or oversight.225
Her ethnographic research at a major Manhattan hospital examines the
delivery of healthcare under Medicaid policy, specifically the Prenatal Care
Assistance Program (PCAP), focusing on the compelled interviews of
pregnant women by professionals. These compelled consultations, Bridges
contends, are a “gross and substantial intrusion by the government into
poor, pregnant women’s private lives.”226 They are treated as families
without constitutionally protected privacy.
Bridges argues that this treats wealth as the precondition for exercise of
privacy rights and that it is assumed that poor families do not deserve such
protection because they cannot produce good citizens.227 Privacy is not given
away; rather, she argues, these mothers and families never had it to begin
with because of poverty, and because they are women.228 Her claim about the
nature of privacy and the justification for negative state action as oversight
is a critical insight about how this is justified, how it operates in terms of
principles, and how the state begins the process of marginalizing children.
Because families are the core ecology for children, marginalizing families in
this way replicates hierarchy for children not just at birth but before birth.
Bridges’s analysis reminds us that state action framed as support for children
and families should be viewed with caution and skepticism.
224 For concerns about state intervention and the pattern of treatment of poor families, see also
Bach, supra note 85 (the price for assistance is regulatory oversight and punitive mechanisms).
225 Bridges, Towards a Theory of State Visibility, supra note 216; see also Michele Goodwin & Erwin
Chemerinsky, Pregnancy, Poverty, and the State, 127 YALE L.J. 1270 (2018) (reviewing KHIARA M.
BRIDGES, THE POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS (2017)) (linking poverty and state action to creating and
perpetuating poverty).
226 Bridges, Privacy Rights, supra note 216, at 116.
227
228

Id.
Id.
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One final example of the construction of hierarchy among children by
race and gender is the work of Priscilla Ocen.229 Ocen’s focus is Black girls in
the context of efforts to end trafficking, efforts that nevertheless result in
increased criminalization of Black girls for prostitution-related offenses. She
links the experience of Black girls to structural factors.230 She also criticizes
the operation of school and the juvenile justice systems on girls as part of
connected systems that disproportionately treat girls as criminals instead of
victims.231
Ocen links these patterns to the history of differential treatment of girls
of color, resulting in the construction of their childhood as “liminal
childhood.”232 Black girls are neither one thing or another, not children and
not adults, part of the stereotypes attached to Black women that have origins
in slavery and Jim Crow. “The stereotypes that deny Black children their
childhood are both racialized and gendered.”233 She argues “presumptions of
childhood” are highly variable due to race and gender biases, resulting in,
among other actions, the “overpolicing and underprotection of . . . Black
girls.”234 This exclusion from the favored view of who is a “child” mirrors
Bridges’s and Lenhardt’s arguments, rendering Black girls outside reforms
intended to treat girls involved in trafficking with dignity, as victims instead
of criminals.235
As I have argued in my work focusing on the life course of Black boys,
their developmental challenges are inextricably tied to race and the
treatment of them, their families, and their communities.236 My model of
developmental equality is built on the recognition of the developmental
barriers and challenges that undermine developmental capacity rather than

229 Priscilla A. Ocen, (E)racing Childhood: Examining the Racialized Construction of Childhood and
Innocence in the Treatment of Sexually Exploited Minors, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1586 (2015).
230 Id.
231 Id.

Id. at 1607–08.
Id. at 1593–94.
234 Id. at 1593.
235 Ocen argues in another work that a similar pattern explains the criminalization of Black mothers,
prosecuting them for drug offenses rather than providing treatment in a way never done for White
women unless they are poor. Priscilla A. Ocen, Birthing Injustice: Pregnancy as a Status Offense, 85 GEO.
WASH. L. REV . 1163 (2017).
236 Dowd, Black Boys Matter, supra note 73.
232
233
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support it.237 But this bears constant focus and reinforcement as otherwise
the face of “children’s” equality can too easily become either an imaginary
neutral child or the preferred white child.
Keeping race, gender, and class central to the project of promoting
equality and dismantling hierarchies among children is critical to avoid the
domestication of a robust children’s equality doctrine. Attention is critical
because of intersections between stereotypes and treatment of Black bodies,
and other bodies of color, with gender and class.238 The wealth of race
scholarship reminds us that these inequities begin in childhood and
reproduce in the ecology that denies equal development to children of color
through the undermining of their families and communities.
E.

Equality Redefined: The Example of Early Childhood

Equality, equity, and dignity are co-constitutive of children’s
equality.239 The consequences of this definition of substantive equality are
perhaps best appreciated by a specific example. Ensuring developmental
equality in children’s earliest years would translate into a comprehensive
early childhood system that would include family supports (income support;
safe, sufficient stable housing in an affirmative neighborhood setting;
employment; childcare; medical/healthcare) that would ensure that families
however structured would be strongly supported in their capacity to nurture
children and support their maximum development.240 Early childhood care
and early childhood education would be universally available and of high
quality. Supports to further cognitive equality might include early literacy

DOWD, REIMAGINING EQUALITY , supra note 3; Dowd, Black Boys Matter, supra note 73.
See, e.g., DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE
MEANING OF LIBERTY (Vintage Books 2017) (1997); DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE
COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE (2002); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012). These intersections include the treatment of
Black mothers and Black families; policies toward fathers including fathers of color and low-income
fathers; and the impact of mass incarceration, family wealth, and intergenerational economic
inequality.
239 These sketches of the implications of this definition of equality are consistent with
comprehensive policies that exist in other countries. See, e.g., HUDSON & K ÜHNER, INNOCENTI REPORT
CARD, supra note 89.
240 What I describe here is a comprehensive system for children, but ideally the systems are inclusive
of all adults, not limited to adults with children. So, for example, systems of health care, economic
support, and policing/public safety to support children’s equality should support the well-being of all.
237
238
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and medical services to support parents. Attention to the social
determinants of health would extend the support of parents and families
prenatally, to ensure the highest level of prenatal care, but also to ensure
attention to environmental factors that could negatively affect parents or
their developing child either pre-birth or after birth. Families would be
assured of economic support and of the ability to balance work and family.
The support of families would be attentive to communities within which
families are located. Equality defined as the same outcome and opportunity
linked to maximizing individual capacity would incorporate sameness tied
to outcomes and opportunities, providing the foundation in early childhood
for equal social citizenship. Equity would require attention to each child’s
needs and context, and the ecology essential to their support (families and
communities). Dignity would ensure the concrete actions necessary to
valuing each child’s humanity by the quality, individualization,
multidimensionality, and intersectionality embraced in their support.
In the next Part, I identify children’s rights as the framework for
children’s equality rights. The first Section identifies the arguments for
children as distinct constitutional subjects that are the basis for an
overarching children’s rights doctrine essential to constitutional analysis.
The second Section discusses the threads in existing constitutional cases
supportive of children’s rights that include children’s equality rights.
III. CHILDREN’S EQUALITY AND CHILDREN’S RIGHTS
Developmental equality incorporates the evidence-based scientific
knowledge of development along with critical examination of existing
hierarchies that impose developmental inequities. Developmental equality
envisions dismantling the pattern of subordination of some children and the
privileging of others, in favor of providing all children with an equal ability
to maximize their developmental capacity and opportunity. A robust
equality principle, inclusive of equality, equity, and dignity, ensures that the
goal of fairness is meaningfully implemented and measured to take account
of current inequities but also build a structurally and culturally equal society
for all children. This identification of the issues and of the means to address
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them assumes that children have special and powerful claims to equality as
constitutional subjects.241
What remains is justifying why children have distinctive rights. Section
A describes the theoretical basis and framework of children’s rights. Section
B identifies the threads of existing constitutional doctrine compatible with
children’s rights generally, and specifically, children’s right to
developmental equality.
A.

Children’s Rights

Why do children have distinctive equality rights? First, they are unique
because they are dependent on adults for their development. Their needs
give them an affirmative claim on social resources to ensure their
developmental success. Second, they are vulnerable because of their lack of
development, vulnerability that changes over time and must be balanced
with their evolving capacities. It is an essential positive characteristic of
development that is the foundation for their being and for their evolution.
Third, they are valued and valuable because they are children. Their
perspectives and understandings are unique; they are not simply becoming
adults, or mini adults; they are themselves, in their own right. Their
humanity is precious and valuable. Finally, they are our future; they join
society and democracy, their neighborhoods and communities, as full social
citizens when they reach adulthood. Their future role makes their
development and their equality socially essential.242
The most articulate voice on children’s rights is Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse.243 In her most recent book, she points to the toxic ecology
(physical and social) surrounding all children and its impact on their small
worlds.244 Those small worlds are even more toxic when we look to poor
241 On positive rights arguments, see generally Martin Guggenheim, The (Not So) New Law of the
Child, 127 YALE L.J. FORUM 942 (2018) [hereinafter Guggenheim, The (Not So) New Law of the Child].
He has strongly argued that families are the best vehicle to serve children’s interests. MARTIN
GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS (2005).
242 See also on children’s distinctive qualities, John E. Coons et al., Educational Opportunity: A
Workable Constitutional Test for State Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 305, 313–17 (1969).
243 BARBARA BENNETT WOODHOUSE , THE ECOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD: H OW OUR CHANGING
WORLD THREATENS CHILDREN’S RIGHTS (2020) [hereinafter WOODHOUSE , ECOLOGY OF
CHILDHOOD].
244 Id.
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communities of color, and the multiple barriers, roadblocks, and
subordination that doom children just as clearly as if they had been marked
at birth. Woodhouse orients her evaluation of children’s rights and needs on
an ecological model that she calls ecogenerist.245 It draws its inspiration from
the work of Urie Bronfenbrenner, and it is foundational to my model of
developmental equality.246 As Woodhouse notes, children are situated in
levels of ecology, nested and interacting systems.247 Ideally those systems
function synergistically to facilitate every child’s well-being and maximum
development. Asymmetry, toxicity, and inadequacy impact systems that
affect the worlds in which children function and differentially affect their
opportunity to develop to their capacity. As Woodhouse notes, the
overarching system of ideas, the macrosystem, drives the structures, systems,
and their interaction in the small worlds of children.248 A recognition of
children’s rights would mean a significant shift in the macrosystem that
would include children’s equality rights to equal developmental
opportunity. Woodhouse enriches this overarching perspective by
incorporating social and developmental knowledge of what children need,
what works to support those needs, and what forces and policies, to the
contrary, undermine children’s development.249 The generist part of her
model is the obligation of one generation to another; writ large, it is society’s
role in the holistic support of children and youth, critically accomplished by
state structures and policies, although also dependent on private efforts and
mutual support.250
The justification for children’s rights, according to Woodhouse, is
rooted in the uniqueness of childhood, and the needs and evolving capacities
of children that translate when supported into the maximization of their
developmental capacity. Grounded in the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child (CRC), her analysis nevertheless is firmly rooted in
constitutional principles.251

Id.
URIE BRONFENBRENNER, THE ECOLOGY OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: EXPERIMENTS BY NATURE
AND DESIGN (1979).
247 WOODHOUSE, ECOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD , supra note 243.
248 Id.
249 Id.
245
246

250
251

Id.
Id.
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[T]he special nature of childhood, as a time of inherent
dependency and also of evolving capacity, gives rise to another way
of classifying children’s rights—as “needs-based” and “capacitybased” rights. . . . [F]ive core principles . . . should inform our
thinking about children’s rights: Privacy, Agency, Equality,
Dignity, and Protection. . . . [R]ights to privacy and autonomy, and
rights to protection and assistance, function as complementary
elements in a larger theory of children’s rights.252
This framework of constitutional principles is compatible with the
CRC, and the CRC is consistent with American constitutional principles.253
Thus, Woodhouse argues, the CRC is a useful scaffold upon which children’s
perspectives and interests can be constructed.254 Because it has been adopted
by every other country in the world, and implemented over a period of three
decades, it offers a wealth of pragmatic guidance and interpretive choices
regarding the functioning of children’s rights on the ground.255 Woodhouse
cites to the child-friendly version of the CRC as especially helpful to thinking
about children’s rights from children’s perspective: “‘Rights’ are things every
child should have or be able to do.”256
Composed of fifty-four articles, the CRC is committed to core
principles of non-discrimination, equality, and “fairness;” use of the “best
interests of the child” as the guiding principle of all adults making decisions
about children; the provision of positive support for children’s development,
and therefore the recognition of their economic, social, and cultural rights;
and respect for the primary and essential role of the family. As Woodhouse
notes:
The overarching principles of the CRC should inform and reshape
our approach to the ecology of childhood. Among the innovations
in these overarching principles are: (1) holistic approach to best
interests; (2) a commitment that unites public and private spheres;
252 Id. at 212–13 (summarizing ecogeneism); see also W OODHOUSE, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT, supra
note 5.
253 WOODHOUSE, ECOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD , supra note 243.
254 Id.
255 Id.; see Committee on the Rights of the Child, U NITED NATIONS HUM. R TS. OFF. HIGH COMM’R,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRC/Pages/CRCIndex.aspx [https://perma.cc/B75D-FN8C].
256 WOODHOUSE, ECOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD , supra note 243, at 214 (UNICEF child-friendly
version of CRC 2012).
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(3) a focus on systems and systemic change; and (4) a
developmentally informed approach to children’s participation.
Together they have great potential for renewing the ecology of
childhood.257
The specific rights of the CRC include rights of protection, rights of
voice and participation, special rights of children with disabilities and
children who are refugees, and positive rights of support.258 Most important
for the equality rights that I focus on in this Article is the intersection of
principles of equality with rights of development and positive rights that
create public obligations.259 Among the socio-economic rights included in
the CRC are healthcare, education, cultural identity, and respect for the
child’s culture. As Woodhouse points out,
By bridging the divide between private and public responsibility,
the CRC advances a more ecological understanding of children’s
rights. It gives support to the argument that children’s interests are
not marginal to the discussion of policy and must be considered as
a primary element in our individual and collective actions affecting
them.
. . . States Parties must do more than refrain from interfering in the
privacy of the family; they must provide support and assistance. As
in the ecological model, children are seen in social context, in
relationship to their families, and to the surrounding culture and
community, as they are embedded in intimate microsystems and
are dependent on the external exosystems that can either sustain
or fail them. The CRC, like the ecological model, recognizes that
many other influences besides the family play a role in determining
whether an environment is fit for or harmful to children.260
Woodhouse argues that children’s rights require that all policy must be
developmentally informed and respect evolving capacity.261 She emphasizes

257
258

Id. at 220.
G.A. Res. 44/25, Convention on the Rights of the Child (Nov. 20, 1989).

259 The key intersecting sections for developmental equality in the CRC are Article 2 on the best
interests of the child and Article 4 on equality rights. Id. at 2–4.
260 WOODHOUSE, ECOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD , supra note 243, at 222.
261 Id. at 224.
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the importance of solidarity and generativity in her ecogenerist model.262
Strategically, she encourages focus on the microsystemic and exosystemic
level,263 including both legal and non-legal approaches to changing the
macrosystem that can be initiated at the local level.264 Woodhouse’s
conception of children’s rights, particularly her framing of positive
developmental rights, is succinctly captured in the statement by children
themselves about their rights: “[A] world fit for children . . . is a world fit for
everyone.”265
Emily Buss’s theory of developmental jurisprudence266 complements
Woodhouse’s ecological focus and reminds us that law does not solely
operate in the macrosystem but functions very concretely in the lives of
children.267 Buss argues law is a developmental agent, and as such, law
should act in positive ways and do so equally for all children. “Children are
not simply changing as they grow up. They are being raised, and laws, and
legal actors, and all of us as participants in a democracy, play a role, for good
or for ill, in that childrearing.”268 The law, Buss argues, is therapeutic: law is
a treatment provider. It is also developmental, a childrearer:269 law shapes
how children grow up.270 Her normative vision is that “[t]he law should aim
to minimize the developmental harm it imposes and maximize the
developmental benefits it provides.”271 Buss describes the standard to be
achieved as ensuring children are prepared for the exercise of rights and
responsibilities, and law’s developmental role should give priority to, and
support, care as a collective good for “our” children.272 Her concept of
children’s rights therefore mirrors the concept of preparation for social
citizenship.

Id. at ch. 13.
Id.
264 Id.
265 A WORLD FIT FOR US , supra note 31, at 2.
266 Emily Buss, Developmental Jurisprudence, 88 TEMP . L. REV . 741, 741 (2016).
267 Id. at 741. Her focus is particularly on kids and mental health, and the consequences of the
actions of law in child welfare and juvenile justice settings for children’s mental health. Id. at 750–51,
766–67.
268 Id. at 741.
269 Id. at 742.
270 Id. at 741.
262
263

271
272

Id. at 752.
Id. at 753, 756.
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Buss reminds us also to evaluate children’s rights as unique rights.273
Her approach would separate, as Woodhouse does, children’s rights into its
own category and perspective. The analytical mistake that the Supreme
Court has made over and over, according to Buss, is asking what adult rights
children should have, versus asking what rights children have as children.274
The most distinctive characteristic of childhood, she argues, is that
“childhood is . . . a period of rapid change.”275 During this period of change,
the differences of children from adults include children’s capacities, their
fluid identities, and their circumstances of living within custodial
relationships which affect their experiences, status, and opportunities.276
Because of these characteristics, the recognition that “children are different,”
according to Buss, needs to be elaborated in a different way, including the
existence of children’s positive rights as “obligations owed.”277
One other advocate for children’s rights, Anne Dailey, links children’s
developmental needs to “children’s fundamental constitutional rights in the
caregiving relationship.”278 She identifies three forms of children’s rights:
due process protection against intervention in the family, protection of
children’s interests, and “most far-reaching, . . . children’s affirmative
constitutional rights to a minimum level of caregiving services from the
state.”279 Her claim of affirmative rights is a constitutional minimum
grounded upon caregiving relationship rights.280
Dailey’s positive rights claim is grounded in children’s
distinctiveness281 and their needs:
Buss, Constitutional Fidelity, supra note 28, at 355.
Id.
275 Id. at 358. The emerging capacity of children, among other things, is the basis for minor’s
reproductive rights. Michele Goodwin & Naomi Duke, Capacity and Autonomy: A Thought Experiment
on Minors’ Access to Assisted Reproductive Technology, 34 HARV. J.L. & G ENDER 503 (2011); B. Jessie
Hill, Constituting Children’s Bodily Integrity, 64 DUKE L.J. 1295 (2015).
276 Buss, Constitutional Fidelity, supra note 28.
277 Id. at 357, 398–400. Connected to this developmental framing is a more nuanced notion of
children’s vulnerability. Lois A. Weithorn, A Constitutional Jurisprudence of Children’s Vulnerability,
69 HASTINGS L.J. 179 (2017) (detailing how the Supreme Court uses “vulnerability”).
278 Dailey, supra note 28, at 2104.
279 Id.
280 Id. The notion of a minimum is similar to the idea of thresholds for basic capabilities identified
by Martha Nussbaum, although the identification of core capabilities differs. See Dixon & Nussbaum,
supra note 133.
281 Dailey, supra note 28, at 2169.
273
274
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What the Court missed in DeShaney is the fact that affirmative
rights for children are necessary in some circumstances for
children to acquire the very skills of autonomous choice that the
Court in DeShaney seeks to protect. It is not that children have an
absolute right not to be harmed. Rather, from a developmental
perspective, children have a right to the minimum level of
caregiving services necessary to ensure their physical safety.282
Dailey also argues children have affirmative rights because they always
are in someone’s custody, either parents or the state in its parens patriae
role.283 Because they are subject to custodial care, they have a right to the
custodial environments that they need.284 Dailey defines children’s right as a
right to a minimum, to good enough caretaking support.285 In addition, she
advocates a minimum affirmative right to education, because education is
essential to citizenship and autonomous choice.286
Central to the articulation of children’s rights of Woodhouse, Buss, and
Dailey is children’s development. Development is a trigger for, and part of
the rationale for, children’s distinctive rights. In addition, development,
defined as developmental equality, is one of children’s substantive rights.
While development is not the sum total of children’s rights, it is at the core.
My argument is that children’s equality requires maximum development
support for every child and the eradication of current hierarchies.

Id. at 2170.
Id. at 2169–71.
284 Id. at 2171.
285 Id. at 2176. Her more recent work with Laura Rosenbury focuses on recasting family law, arguing
for a reframing and reweighing of interests to value children in more aspects of their lives. Anne C.
Dailey & Laura A. Rosenbury, The New Law of the Child, 127 YALE L.J. 1448 (2018). For youth driven
initiatives and empowerment, see Cheryl Bratt, Top-Down or from the Ground?: A Practical Perspective
on Reforming the Field of Children and the Law, 127 YALE L.J. F ORUM 917 (2018), for an argument in
favor of youth-driven initiatives, using the South African example. For a critique of Dailey &
Rosenbury, see Guggenheim, supra note 241. For a critique of care as a state obligation, see Mary Anne
Case, How High the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling Questions About Where, Why, and How the Burden of
Care for Children Should Be Shifted, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV . 1753 (2001) (whether support for mothers
and children will cause unforeseen backlash).
286 Dailey, supra note 28.
282
283
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Historically, children had no rights; indeed, they were considered the
property of their parents.287 We no longer treat children like property, nor
do we take the view that children have no rights, but we lack a coherent
theory about their rights. Objections to being more explicit and
comprehensive, and objections about adopting the CRC have focused on the
danger this creates for parental rights.288 The short answer to this objection
is that children’s equality rights are not in conflict with parents’ rights, they
are in harmony.289 Where conflict might occur is not due to different goals
of parents and children, but rather the manner in which the state supports
children and how the state conceives of its role.290 To achieve the goal of
children’s equality would require major redistribution and provision of
resources, which creates political challenge.291 It also would be a “sea change”
at the level of constitutional and state law, both of which strongly privilege
parents to control children’s lives.292 Children’s equality could lead to
287 Mintz, supra note 22, at 2; see also Susan Gluck Mezey, Constitutional Adjudication of Children’s
Rights Claims in the United States Supreme Court, 1953–92, 27 FAM. L.Q. 307 (1993) (parent, child, and
classification issues).
288 THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: AN ANALYSIS OF TREATY PROVISIONS
AND IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. RATIFICATION (Jonathan Todres et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter Todres et al.
eds., THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD]; WOODHOUSE, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT,
supra note 5.
289 Parents have the obligation and duty to raise their children as part of the right of family privacy.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). State support
would better enable them to do so irrespective of their private resources, to ensure their children the
opportunity to develop to their fullest capacity. Thus, supporting children’s equality supports parents.
290 Maxine Eichner, The Privatized American Family, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV . 213, 258–65 (2017)
[hereinafter Eichner, The Privatized American Family] (theory of buffered spheres and the necessity of
supporting the private family under a five-point plan).
291 The correction of hierarchies would require political will and dedication of resources. For
example, proposals for universal healthcare are regularly critiqued on the basis of cost. See, e.g., Ronald
Brownstein, The Eye-Popping Cost of Medicare for All, ATLANTIC (Oct. 16, 2019)
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/10/high-cost-warren-and-sanderss-single-payerplan/600166 [https://perma.cc/UG65-UYS3]. More comprehensive proposals to confront the
intersecting systems responsible for children’s inequalities would be even more costly, although
justified. For example, see the justification for spending one percent of the federal government for
children’s needs. ONE PERCENT FOR THE KIDS: NEW POLICIES, BRIGHTER FUTURES FOR AMERICA’S
CHILDREN (Isabel Sawhill ed., 2003).
292 Alstott argues, “[T]he metric of equality should be whether each child’s developmental
conditions will leave her at the threshold of adulthood with a set of opportunities that meet the equality
criterion and the capacity to exercise judgment and bring values to bear in the choice she makes.” Anne
L. Alstott, Is the Family at Odds with Equality? The Legal Implications of Equality for Children, 82 S.
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 13 (2008). She identifies the qualities of an equal opportunity state, but questions
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intrusive regulation of the family to meet state goals, purportedly to achieve
children’s equality.293 This is a significant and critical concern that must be
addressed in the implementation of children’s rights. Instead of resistance to
children’s equality framed as a parent-child conflict, the more likely conflict
is between some parents and the state (parents subjected to hierarchies
similar to their children’s hierarchies).294
Whether framed as rights or interests, children’s constitutional
position requires a distinctive approach that complements existing
constitutional doctrine on parents and families. The conception of
children’s rights is one that reflects core constitutional principles as well as
an evolving understanding of the family and the state, designed to
incorporate and support children to become full adult citizens.
B.

Constitutional Cases: The Threads upon Which a Doctrine of Children’s
Equality Rights Can Be Built

Children’s rights are the framework within which children’s equality
rests. Their substantive equality, incorporating equality, equity, and dignity,
requires developmental equality. Developmental equality ensures the
support of each child to maximize their developmental capacity and
therefore their equal opportunities and outcomes. Their equality rights
require paying attention to identities and current hierarchies and engaging
in necessary structural and systemic change. These positive rights thus
require the state not only to refrain from harm or subordination, but to
actively support the development of all children as empowered equal social
citizens.
In this Section, I explore what constitutional threads exist as a
foundation to sustain a coherent, robust framework of children’s rights.
That framework would be the foundation for judicial or legislative action
whether the family as family is inherently at odds with equality because families are unequal to each
other and within families, parental autonomy undermines children’s equality and liberty. She sees that
a shift to give greater support to children would be a dramatic change. Id.; see also Annette Ruth Appell,
Uneasy Tensions Between Children’s Rights and Civil Rights, 5 NEV. L.J. 141 (2004). Katherine Franke is
cautious about a more expansive state role. Katherine M. Franke, Taking Care, 76 CHI.-KENT. L. REV .
1541 (2001).
293 Alstott, supra note 292; Appell, supra note 292.
294 On state intrusiveness for some parents but not all parents, along familiar lines of hierarchy, see
for example the analysis of Lenhardt, supra note 218; Bridges, supra note 216; supra Section II.D.
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grounded in children’s affirmative constitutional rights.295 There has been
some recognition in judicial opinions of children’s relational interests; my
focus here is on their socio-economic interests, what they can demand from
the state, or the state’s responsibilities.296
Existing constitutional doctrine includes several threads that support a
doctrine of children’s rights, particularly their equality rights.
1.

Children Are Clearly Valued in Constitutional Law. Most Often They
Are Valued by Recognizing the Importance of Parents and Families.297

The family is foundational to society and to democracy.298 The
importance of family, unarticulated in the Constitution, nevertheless is
recognized in the doctrine of substantive due process and is the basis of
concepts of fundamental rights.299 The importance of children is central to
that perspective/doctrine.300 Many of the key constitutional cases regarding
fundamental rights center around children and their well-being, and
reinforce the critical role of family in their lives and development.301
295 At the same time, it must be acknowledged that some constitutional cases potentially pose
barriers that must be addressed. These include the rejection of education as a fundamental right, San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), and viewing parental rights
doctrine as in potential conflict with children’s rights. The most significant is the view that our
Constitution is one of negative rights. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189
(1989). I address these problematic threads in the last part of this Section.
296 On the responsive state, see Eichner, The Privatized American Family, supra note 290; and the
responsive state from a vulnerabilities lens, see MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED
MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); Martha
Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251 (2010).
297 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494 (1977); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(2015). Although not a constitutional case, I would also include in this pantheon Adoptive Couple v.
Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 (2013). The high value accorded to families within children’s rights is a core
component of international law doctrines. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Family-Supportive
Nature of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, in Todres et al. eds., THE U.N. CONVENTION
ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 288.
298 Meyer, 262 U.S. 390; Pierce, 268 U.S. 510.

Id.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584.
301 See, e.g., Meyer, 262 U.S. 390; Pierce, 268 U.S. 510; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Ayotte
v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320 (2006).
299
300
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These cases establish a basic rule that parents’ rights are fundamental,
highly respected, natural, and sacrosanct.302 Many of these cases involve
controversies framed as parents versus the state, or state intrusion into the
family or into parental decisionmaking.303 Such intrusion is highly
disfavored, even when there are significant state interests, such as the interest
in children’s education in Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.304
Other cases involve intra-familial disputes between parents or parental
figures who disagree about children’s best interests, and the role of the state
as the referee or ultimate decisionmaker.305 The strong recognition of
parental rights does not mean that parental rights are absolute or
unreviewable, as evidenced by countless decisions about custody, parental
timesharing, and the application of the best interests doctrine.306
The parental rights doctrine, however, obscures children’s interests,
and their relationship to the state. With respect to parents, children are lost
in the recognition of parental and family rights, rendered largely
constitutionally invisible. Doctrine assumes that children’s and parents’
interests are identical or parallel, and that parents are best situated to act on
behalf of their children; or that children are not capable of knowing their
interests or what is “best” for them.
Even when children are more visible, they quickly disappear. For
example, in Obergefell, children are prominently mentioned in Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion as one of the four reasons why marriage is such
a significant status and privilege, and thus a fundamental right: marriage is
the preferred relationship within which to have children, providing them
with recognition, stability, and protection.307 Children, marriage, and family
are interlinked in this analysis, a paean to marriage. But after this prominent

302 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (“The liberty interest at issue in this case—the interest of parents in the
care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by this Court.”). This is also reflected in the high standard required for termination of
parental rights, and the obligation that the state provide counsel in involuntary termination cases, and
the clarity required in voluntary relinquishment for adoption.
303 See, e.g., id. at 65–67; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
304 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399–400; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35.
305 In Palmore, Adoptive Couple, and Troxel, the state is determining resolution of controversies
between parental figures or quasi-parental figures.
306 Troxel, 530 U.S. 57.
307 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015).
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statement, children disappear from the analysis.308 Marriage and family
dominate from the perspective of the adult pair.309 Had a children’s rights
perspective been sustained, it might have built upon and enriched this
slender foundation. The interests of children might be parallel but might be
different or simply distinctive from those of their parents. Had children been
considered throughout Obergefell, their interests would have been further
explored.310
Recognizing children’s rights as implicit in the well-established
parental rights doctrine makes sense and enriches the analysis of parental
rights cases. Re-reading several cases with a children’s rights perspective
allows us to explore what this might mean. For example, in Troxel v.
Granville, the case involving a dispute between a parent and grandparents
over visitation, a children’s rights perspective might consider the
grandchildren’s experience with, and the meaning attached to, their
relationship with their grandparents.311 It might also place that relationship
in context with their primary family at the time of the decision, which
included their adoptive father.312 The constitutional issue raised in Troxel,
regarding the right of a parent to regulate the other familial relationships in
their children’s lives, thus might not be solely viewed by comparing the
mother to the grandparents, but also by considering the perspective and
interests of the children with respect to all of the significant adults in their
lives. Similarly, in Michael H. v. Gerald D., involving the claim of a biological
father to sustain his social relationship with his child, who he had lived with
and parented, after the mother reconciled with her husband, one might
consider the child’s relationship with all relevant parental figures, including
the child’s mother, her mother’s husband, and her biological/social father.313
The majority opinion dismissed consideration of the child’s constitutional

308 Catherine Smith, Obergefell’s Missed Opportunity, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 223 (2016)
(Obergefell could have put children more front and center in the opinion, but the case does create future
opportunity); see also Susan Hazeldean, Anchoring More than Babies: Children’s Rights After Obergefell
v. Hodges, 38 CARDOZO L. REV . 1397 (2017) (linking to rights of immigrant children).
309 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584.
310 Only in Troxel, does Justice Stevens discuss this in his dissenting opinion. In Michael H. v. Gerald
D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), where the interests of the child are squarely raised, they are nevertheless dealt
with dismissively.
311 Troxel, 530 U.S. 57.
312
313

Id. at 86–90.
Michael H., 491 U.S. 110.
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interests, but reconsideration might evaluate the evidence of the guardian ad
litem who had concluded that denial of the child’s relationship with her
biological father would harm the child.314 Finally, in Adoptive Couple v. Baby
Girl,315 a case involving a conflict between prospective adoptive parents and
the biological father, where the child had spent significant time living with
all parties in the case, a children’s rights perspective might encourage
consideration of the child’s relationships with all functional parents. In
addition, one might consider the impact of framing the issue as one set of
parents over another at a moment in time, a framing focusing on adult
interests in their relationship with the child, as opposed to seeing the issue
in terms of its impact on the future development of the child.
2. Children’s Developmental Interests Are Acknowledged by
Constitutional Recognition of Parental Responsibility, but That
Responsibility Is Typically Framed as Exclusively Familial. Privatization Is
Seen as Protecting the Family, but It Withdraws Support from Children, by
Minimizing Responsibility for Children of the State or Broader Society.316
Existing constitutional doctrine both overvalues and undervalues
families with respect to children’s development. Our rendering of children
as hidden and families as privatized, protected structures of responsibility
suggests we think respect for family renders children “equal enough.” In
other words, if the respect for parental and family privacy is equal, and
increasingly broad concepts of “parent” and “family” are inclusive of the
range of family forms and diversity of family cultures within which children
grow and develop, each child benefits from family privacy. Family privacy
honors and respects family, but family privacy is problematic in two ways.
First, it is questionable whether all families are respected. The sharply
different support for marital and non-marital families (and therefore for the

Id.
570 U.S. 637 (2013) (decided on statutory grounds).
316 Susan Frelich Appleton, Obergefell’s Liberties: All in the Family, 77 OHIO S T. L.J. 919 (2016)
[hereinafter Appleton, Obergefell’s Liberties]. Appleton notes that one impact of the interplay between
constitutional law and family law is the privatization of responsibility. While family forms may expand,
family responsibilities, she argues, remain privatized. Id.; see also Susan Frelich Appleton, How
Feminism Remade American Family Law (And How It Did Not), in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FEMINIST
JURISPRUDENCE 426 (Robin West & Cynthia Grant Bowman eds., 2019).
314
315
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children within those family forms),317 and the breakdown of respect for
family and parents when children are raised in families that are poor and
nonwhite belies the notion that all families are equally respected.318 To the
contrary, in the name of protecting or helping children, the state can be
egregiously intrusive.319 Second, the doctrine of family privacy relieves the
state and society of their responsibility to children’s development.
Privatization and respect for the importance of family, however, might be
read in a different way, to enhance the argument for children’s rights.
Children’s rights compare children within different families who have
common developmental needs. Families must be equal, or equally
supported, for children to be equal. Limited state intervention should not
mean limited state support. Rather, the responsive state would ensure the
necessary support for every child, starting with essential support to their
primary developmental ecology, their family. This means reading the
parental and family rights cases with children’s interests in mind.
Moore v. City of East Cleveland is an example of a case that exemplifies
the critical ecology of parents and family for children; with respect to social
and economic rights, their interests are intertwined.320 The grandmother in
that case, who fought to prevent removal of her grandson from her home
under a zoning ordinance, had also earlier brought suit to ensure that he
could be enrolled in school.321 Her claim of “family” respect and protection
317 Bridges, Towards a Theory of State Visibility, supra note 216 (intrusion into the lives of Black
mothers and fathers); Lenhardt, Race, Dignity, and the Right to Marry, supra note 27 (nonmarital
families article).
318 Bridges, Privacy Rights, supra note 216; Bridges, Towards a Theory of State Visibility, supra note
216; Hatcher, supra note 88. It is important to recognize the differential burdens of the poor and
families of color. Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). Smith is a
case about removal of foster kids from foster parents, and the rights of those parents. The case
acknowledges the critique of intrusiveness due to poverty and disproportionality by race, and that
recognition of foster parents as coequal to “natural” families would disproportionately affect poor and
Black families. The opinion stays away from an analysis of the child’s perspective, which was the basis
for the lower court’s ruling in favor of foster parents. Id.
319 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (state can cap welfare based on the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children at $250.00 per month regardless of the family’s size or need). This is a key
case, like DeShaney. The Court permits the state not only to provide inadequate assistance, but to
discriminate among poor children by upholding the family cap, in effect paying less per capita to
children in larger families, allegedly as a legitimate means to encourage employment and discourage
dependency. Id.
320 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
321 Id.
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could be strengthened by consideration of her grandson’s independent
interests in his “family.”322 In addition, the Moore family interacted with
systems essential to her grandson’s support, within a community important
to the support and valuing of the family. Imagine a responsive state instead
of an intrusive one that twice infringed on the needs of this child and his
family.323
The ecology of family is critical, based on the developmental data, to
children’s growth. To ensure a healthy ecology for every child, families must
be supported in order to support children. An argument focused on
children’s equality does not mean separating children from their parents, in
policy or in fact. Rather than using the core parental and family rights cases
to absolve the state from responsibility, they should be used to justify
support of family, and make it positive support that enhances the strength
of the communities in which families are embedded.
3. A Basis for Broad Support for Children as a Social and State
Responsibility, Not Solely a Private Family Responsibility, May Be Found
in the Doctrine of Parens Patriae.
Parens patriae is the state’s role to ensure “the interests of society to
protect the welfare of children . . . . It is the interest of youth itself, and of the
whole community, that children be both safeguarded from abuses and given
opportunities for growth into free and independent well-developed men and
citizens.”324 Parens patriae thus not only acts as a limitation on parental
rights, but also is a basis for state and social responsibility for children. As a
doctrine that has evolved considerably over time, parens patriae would be
considerably enhanced by recognition of children’s rights and interests.325
322 Id. For a re-reading of Moore, see Robin A. Lenhardt & Clare Huntington, Foreword, Moore
Kinship, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2551 (2017). On the importance of caregiving to children, see Dailey,
supra note 28; Eichner, The Privatized American Family, supra note 290.
323 See discussion supra text accompanying notes 298–300 on the dangers of the intrusive state. See,
e.g., Dandridge, 397 U.S. 471.
324 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). This interest of the state is not negated by a claim
of religious practice. Id.
325 The doctrine has evolved from hierarchical and patriarchal concepts of the state and of the
family; in the modern welfare state, one of the key roles of the state is care for the well-being of children.
See Kay P. Kindred, God Bless the Child: Poor Children, Parens Patriae, and a State Obligation to Provide
Assistance, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 519, 526 n.45 (1996).
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For example, the role of the state as protector might be recast or
refocused on children’s equality, to protect children against discrimination
and enhance their equality interests.326 The state within its parens patriae
role could also act affirmatively on behalf of society to support children,
particularly with respect to education, health, and limiting children’s
employment.327 Each of these affirmative acts by the state represents a
recognition of the responsibility of the state and society in general for the
well-being and development of children. This responsibility is framed as
achieving maximum opportunity, not a minimum.328 A children’s rights
doctrine would more clearly elevate this role of the state from a voluntary to
a mandatory responsibility and would ensure that support would be
informed by both developmental and equality interests of children.

326 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984). Abuse and neglect doctrines or involuntary termination
of rights are instances where the state is cast as the protector of children. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745 (1982). In Santosky, the daughter was removed first; then son was removed ten months later; and
when a third child was born, the child was removed three days after birth. The opinion fails to account
for the collective and individual perspectives of the three children, and more particularly, why only one
child was initially removed from the parent’s care. The Court describes this as “a parens patriae interest
in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child.” Id. at 766. The state plays a similar role when the
interests of parents and children are in conflict, to ensure that parents do not abuse their power. Parham
v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). In these consolidated cases, the Court considered the admission of children
to mental hospitals upon the recommendation of their parents. The children were quite young: J.L. was
six years old when admitted; J.R. was seven years old. Id. The articulation of parental rights and interests
in this case is quite strong; children’s liberty interests are recognized but combined with parental rights.
The state also acts as protector when ensuring that children are protected in judicial proceedings
consistent with constitutional due process guarantees. See also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 855
(1990) (upholding procedure for child witness in child abuse case as not in conflict with the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause, based on the state’s interest in the well-being of the child;
discussion of the state’s “transcendent interest in [] the welfare of children”).
327 Prince, 321 U.S. 158. See also the education cases, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954); San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202 (1982); Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
328 Supra text accompanying notes 122–123, 135–137.
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Children Are Clearly Recognized in Constitutional Law as Different
from Adults.329

Although children are recognized as different from adults in
constitutional law, still lacking is a more coherent and comprehensive
articulation of their rights, and the rationale for their distinctive rights. The
classic articulation of the basis of children’s difference is a three-part
standard. Three “reasons justifying the conclusion that the constitutional
rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults [are]: the peculiar
vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an
informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child
rearing.”330 This is the basis for treating children in some instances as less
than full constitutional subjects.331
Children’s difference has evolved from judicial notice to grounding in
interdisciplinary developmental science. This has led to a more nuanced
developmental perspective especially with respect to adolescents.332 The
cases include some that rest on children’s lack of capacity based on this
developmental perspective,333 and others that recognize adolescents’
capacity to make independent choices.334 This recognized developmental
perspective invites a fuller, more expansive use of developmental scholarship
that reflects age-based general differences, but also understands
development as a moving target, rather than seeing children as

329 “[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.” Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979). This observation, of course, is but the beginning of the analysis. The Court
long has recognized that the status of minors under the law is unique in many respects. “As Mr. Justice
Frankfurter aptly put it: ‘Children have a very special place in life which law should reflect. Legal
theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred
to determination of a State’s duty towards children.’” Id. at 633–34.
330 Id.
331 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); see also Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (distinctive role of the state in regulating to limit access of children to
particular information; parens patriae role of the state).
332 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Miller
v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011).
333 See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358 (1970).
334 Bellotti, 443 U.S. 622; Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood
of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320 (2006).
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undifferentiated.335 The developmental perspective, in other words, is
present in constitutional law but merits expansion.336 The use of a
developmental frame so far primarily has been to understand children but
not as yet to recognize children’s development rights.
Beyond its use to evaluate capacity,337 development should be used in a
different way—to identify needs, but also to identify and evaluate the needs
of individual children. Furthermore, developmental research and
perspective, critically evaluated, might also be used to evaluate the key
systems that impact children. Of critical importance to the broad use of the
developmental perspective is to use a framework that understands that the
process of development is not neutral, because the context for all children is
not neutral.338 Specifically, the context for children of color currently is
strongly negatively influenced by racism, creating challenges and barriers
that impact children’s equality because their developmental path is affected
by identity.339 The developmental perspective is one place where formalized,
inadequate notions of race and racism might be addressed, including
comprehending how race functions in children’s lives.340 A more nuanced
development perspective should make the inequities clearer, and the
responsibility of society and the state also clear: to achieve every child’s right
to maximize their developmental capacity, and equality.
5. Children’s Equality Rights Are Distinctive and Unique Due to Their
Developmental Interests, and Equality Among and Between Children Has
Been Recognized.
The distinctive, affirmative equality rights of children are linked to
their developmental needs and the scope of the obligation to them, that every
DOWD, REIMAGINING EQUALITY , supra note 3; supra Part II.
WOODHOUSE, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT, supra note 5.
337 Supra text accompanying notes 332–333 (juvenile justice case); supra text accompanying note
334 (reproductive rights case).
338 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984). Elements in this decision can be read to establish a state
duty to children regarding race, and the obligation that the state cannot directly or indirectly reinforce
bias through law.
339 Supra text accompanying notes 108–117.
340 This is an area of need and caution, as epitomized by the specific instance of how courts and
commentators read the doll studies in Brown, the erasure of race in many family law cases, and the
undermining of welfare rights.
335
336
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child should be supported to their maximum development. Children’s
equality rights are supported by two lines of constitutional cases, those
dealing with illegitimate/non-marital children, and with public education.
The illegitimacy cases, involving challenges to state statutes that denied
support or inheritance rights to non-marital children, are remarkable for
their judicial evolution from a simple rationality argument to a more careful
articulation about what is wrong with these classifications.341 The cases are a
part of a broader dialogue about equal protection analysis and how different
classifications trigger ever increasing levels of scrutiny.342 Illegitimacy is a
state created identity that impacts economic support.343 In Trimble v.
Gordon, the culminating case of this evolution in analytical standards,344 a
now developed articulation of why such classifications are wrong is
articulated: Children are innocents, dependents, reliant on others for their
support; they are equal in that dependency.
The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society’s
condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of
marriage. But visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant
is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the
illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that
legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual
responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible
for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual—
as well as an unjust—way of deterring the parent.

341 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (wrongful death of the parent); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S.
535 (1973) (child support); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) (child support and paternity and statute
of limitations); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (intestate succession); Glona v. Am. Guar. &
Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (wrongful death of the child). This area of doctrine is not completely
consistent. See Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
342 Illegitimacy was the origin of intermediate analysis under equal protection.
343 Clark, 486 U.S. 456; Glona, 391 U.S. 73; Gomez, 409 U.S. 535; Labine, 401 U.S. 532; Levy, 391 U.S.
68; Trimble, 430 U.S. 762.
344 430 U.S. 762. The Court rejects strict scrutiny as necessary, without explaining why, but says the
scrutiny will nevertheless be strong; at the same time, it says the mere statement of a legitimate state
purpose (support of families) is not enough. Id. at 767. Rather, the state has to show how this
classification serves that end (so the court is distancing itself from Labine). Id. at 769. The Court then
rejects the family support argument as illegitimate/unsupportable because to do so burdens children
who had nothing to do with their parents’ decision. Id. at 769–70.
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The parents have the ability to conform their conduct to societal
norms, but their illegitimate children can affect neither their
parents’ conduct nor their own status.345
These cases stand for the irrationality of hierarchies among children
because all children have needs that must be addressed. They are central to
an argument for children’s equality. The principle of the dependency of
children and their equality in that dependency is the thread that emerges in
these cases, beyond the notion that labelling them based on their parents’
marital status is irrational and unjustified. This is a children’s rights position,
the closest we come to examining issues through children’s perspective and
with awareness of their dependency, particularly here, their economic
dependency.
Similarly, the education cases establish a principle of children’s equality
with respect to education, one of the most critical developmental supports
provided to children. Brown v. Board of Education remains a key equality
case for children, even with its shortcomings as applied.346 In Brown, the
Court assumes that white schools are all equal and superior to Black schools.
That superiority exists even in the face of “objectively” equal but separate
schools. The mere separation of children by race is inherently unequal.347
The unspoken assumption is that white schools are better, and also that
integrated schools will be equal schools. Once you open the schoolhouse
door, the Court assumes the outcome will be equality; an equality not only
of bricks and mortar, but also of culture and meaning.348 The Court views
the only children harmed as Black children because it understands that is the
meaning of separated schools whether equal by objective measures or not.349
Inherent even in that limited view is the replication of privilege for white
children as part of the process of creating stigma and difference. Segregation
is not a formalized system; it is a totalized system. Ending it requires

345 Id. at 769–70 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (footnote
omitted)).
346 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1 (1973); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
551 U.S. 701 (2007).
347 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
348
349

Id.
Id.
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achieving equality that is substantive, not simply formal. Brown is a great
case, a critical case, but its meaning must be redefined.350
Cases applying Brown struggle with its meaning.351 Two of those cases
are particularly important to children’s equality rights. In San Antonio v.
Rodriguez, the Court refused to invalidate the Texas school financing system,
despite its unequal allocation of funds to school districts along wealth
lines.352 The Court failed to recognize wealth discrimination or class status
as triggering higher scrutiny; found that no child was deprived of an
education, and implied any such right at most would be to a minimum or
adequate education; and refused to recognize education as a fundamental
right, although it was recognized as incredibly important.353 In dissent,
Justice Marshall makes arguments consistent with the concept of
developmental equality.354 He would find a fundamental right to education
rather than wait for the legislature to do this while the harm continues to
children.355 He grounds his analysis in focusing on children. Education’s
importance to children is linked to other rights, particularly to preparing
them to exercise their political rights, rather than the developmental
argument with which he began.356
On the other hand, Plyler v. Doe links educational rights to the equality
rights recognized for non-marital children, rejecting the exclusion of
undocumented children from Texas schools.357 Sanctioning children by
denying them an education is treated as parallel to marking children born
outside of marriage as undeserving of support.358 Moreover, the nature of
the deprivation is seen as especially egregious. Even if education is not
recognized as a right, in Plyler, the Court seems to treat it so in all but
name.359 It is recognized as critically important to the child and society; as

350 In work in progress, I argue that Brown is capable of being read in a far more radical way. Radical
Brown (work in progress).
351 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 551 U.S. 701.
352 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
353 Id.
354 Id.
355 Id.
356 Id.
357 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
358
359

Id.
Id.
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the means to political participation and group and individual equality.360
Denial imposes illiteracy and inability to contribute. This is essentially an
argument for the concept of social citizenship for children. As with the
illegitimacy cases, the children here are visible and central, not subsumed
under the rights or interests of their parents.361 The strength of the Plyler
decision suggests that there is real potential to work around, limit, or
override Rodriguez, and return to the robust potential of Brown.362
6.

Challenges to Children’s Rights Remain.

I have identified the basis for support of children’s rights, but it is
important to acknowledge what stands in the way. First, the rejection of
education as a fundamental right in Rodriguez is an unavoidable barrier to
the affirmative rights of children that must be addressed.363 I would argue, as
have others, that the case was wrongly decided.364 Alternatively, the scope of
those cases might be minimized in a way that would still permit recognition
of children’s equality rights. This implicates the meaning and application of
Brown,365 requiring reexamination of the meaning of equality in that case
and its implications for current severe educational inequalities that stymie
children’s development and create hierarchies among children.
Second, the parental rights doctrine, which supports the critical role of
families to realize children’s rights, has historically been raised in resistance
to children’s rights.366 The ability to recognize and balance multiple interests,
Id.
Id.
362 For a sampling of the commentary critical of Rodriguez plus a broad notion of educational
equality, see, for example, Camille Walsh, Erasing Race, Dismissing Class: San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez, 21 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 133 (2011); Goodwin Liu, The Parted Paths of
School Desegregation and School Finance Litigation, 24 L. & INEQ. 81 (2006); Maurice R. Dyson,
Rethinking Rodriguez After Citizens United: The Poor as a Suspect Class in High-Poverty Schools, 24
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1 (2016).
363 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
364 For scholarship critical of DeShaney, see infra note 372. For scholarship critical of San Antonio,
see supra note 362.
365 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
366 Indeed, this was the primary argument raised against signing onto the CRC. Supra text
accompanying note 288. The United States’ outlier status as the sole country that has not signed on to
the CRC suggests these are arguments that it is time to revisit. Even more so with the passage of time,
the fears raised regarding the CRC are unfounded.
360
361
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however, is a core principle of constitutional analysis that can encompass
recognition of children’s rights together with the strong interests of
parents.367 Furthermore, recognition of children’s rights, within a concept of
a responsive state, would facilitate the role of parents, not trample upon
parental rights or intrude upon family privacy, by making it essential that
support for children is not simply a private responsibility.
The most challenging constitutional interpretation to children’s
equality rights, however, and to children’s rights generally, is the view that
the Constitution only recognizes negative rights.368 In DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services, the Court held that a child
had no claim for the state’s failure to protect him from his abusive father,
despite multiple reports of child abuse and investigations substantiating the
abuse. The Court found that the state had done no harm because it had
violated no duty; the harm came from a private actor. In defending this
analysis, the majority famously states that the Constitution protects only
negative rights; it does not confer positive rights.369 In the subsequent case of
Castle Rock v. Gonzales,370 when a police department failed to act to do
anything after a parent violated a custody and protection order, a claim
framed to bypass DeShaney was rejected as well.371 Here, as in other cases,
the interests of the children were subsumed under other arguments; they are
not visible in their own right and from their perspective.
A wealth of commentary has argued why these cases were wrongly
decided.372 The involvement of the state in DeShaney and Castle Rock argues
for state responsibility once children have been identified as at risk. The
trigger of obligation in those cases is clearly sufficient. The claim of solely
negative rights in the Constitution has never addressed the children’s rights
argument that I am making here. Instead of a right of protection, the
children’s equality claim is one of equal developmental support. This would
require comprehensive policy and structural change, not the identification
367 See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
368 Appleton, Obergefell’s Liberties, supra note 316, at 919.
369 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
370 Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
371 Id.
372 For critique of Deshaney, see Rebecca Aviel, Restoring Equipoise to Child Welfare, 62 HASTINGS
L.J. 401 (2010); for critique on Castle Rock, see G. Kristian Miccio, The Death of the Fourteenth
Amendment: Castle Rock and Its Progeny, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 277 (2011); Julie Goldscheid,
Rethinking Civil Rights and Gender Violence, 14 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 43 (2013).
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of particular children at risk of harm. In the area of equality rights, the state’s
obligation is to children as a group, both to end a policy of differentiation,
hierarchies, subordination, and privileging, but also to require that it
affirmatively ensure developmental support. It is the state acting not as the
protector of individual children, but as the supporter of all children,
facilitating their development, and ensuring that each child is supported
equally.
It is important to remember that our case law includes dissenting
opinions that interpret our Constitution to include the ability to reach
private action, embrace social equality as an obligation of the state, recognize
the necessity of affirmative action to reverse the depth of racism and
structural discrimination, and recognize that patterns of
discrimination/disparate impact are sufficient to trigger dismantling
subordinating policies or structures.373 These dissents are not a radical
fringe, but embody a principled basis for doctrine. Dissents historically have
paved the way for emerging rights.374 Following the path of constitutional
dissents at the very least reminds us that we are not bound to our current
doctrine.
Equally important, we might begin a positive rights argument with
Strauder v. West Virginia.375 In that case, decided early in the interpretation
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
clearly acknowledged the affirmative meaning of the equality guarantee:
“The words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they contain a
necessary implication of a positive immunity, or right . . . .”376 Strauder was
acknowledged in Brown as the core of the affirmative right to equality
recognized for children.377 Strauder says much more. Not only does it
recognize the constitutional duty of the state to act, but the case also broadly
defines the equality to be achieved. Strauder represents a clear recognition
that equality is not a formal status but a meaningful sociopolitical state of

373

DOWD, REIMAGINING EQUALITY , supra note 3, at 115–35.

Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Constitutionalization of Children’s Rights: Incorporating
Emerging Human Rights into Constitutional Doctrine, 2 U. PENN. J. C ON. L. 1 (1999).
375 100 U.S. 303 (1879); see also Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879); Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S.
339 (1879).
376 Strauder, 100 U.S. at 307–08.
377 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
374
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being that requires positive action to replace subordination and its
consequences.378
For children, positive rights are essential to prevent reproducing
inequality. Positive rights constitute a distributive argument grounded in the
meaning of equality. Children’s distinctive place in democracy should be a
basis to transcend any judicial hesitation to recognize the necessity of
judicial action.379 Affirmative legislative action, likely to be far more
comprehensive, is clearly unhampered by these issues.380
CONCLUSION
The importance of children’s rights and their equality is undeniable.
These rights are essential to every child’s future and their relationship with
each other. It is critical to adults to fulfill their responsibility to all children
because of the value of each child to all of us; and even, selfishly, to the wellbeing of people who are now adults and will someday be supported by
today’s children.
How can we justify anything less than equality? How would we explain
this, to a child? Imagine, to the contrary, a world with every child treated
with equality, equity, and dignity. Imagine a world with every child fully
supported to become a productive, engaged citizen at the threshold of
adulthood. Imagine children gathered at that threshold. When we pay
particular attention to the identities of who is there and look for the children
who have been historically at the bottom, what if all children are there,
standing together, equal as when they were born. Then we are closer to
making a world fit for children, and ultimately, a world fit for everyone. Our
challenge is to fuse that vision to mechanisms that support rather than
intrude, that empower rather than subordinate, that equalize all rather than
prioritize some.

Strauder, 100 U.S. at 307–08.
Aoife Nolan, Economic and Social Rights, Budgets and the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
21 INT’L J. CHILD . RTS. 248 (2013); NOLAN, CHILDREN’S SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS, supra note 30, at
43–92.
380 Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, supra note 30.
378
379
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